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ABSTRACT 
Small-state foreign policy is often characterized by the types of alliances that form 
between small and large states. It is rarely disputed that small states fend for themselves 
in the global milieu that creates today's societies. Rather, the debate usually begins as to 
why small states seek strategic alliances with large states. 
This thesis, on the other hand, questions the very existence of small-state alliances 
by examining the foreign policy behavior of six small island states. The analysis begins 
with a quantitative breakdown of United Nation voting behaviors by five Pacific states-
Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Next, a description of the policy behavior 
that these five states have demonstrated toward environmental issues is explained. 
Finally, in chapter four the island state of Mauritius, located in the Indian Ocean, is 
examined for its behavior on three specific issues of foreign policy. 
Ultimately, the conclusions tend to suggest that no discemable alliances are 
forming between the selected small states and some of the world's largest powers. Two 
principle reasons why this thesis suggests its findings to be true are because of the recent 
trend that small states have exhibited for participating in international organizations, and 
because of the eminent threat that issues such as global warming place on fragile island 
ecosystems. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would first like to thank Dr. Ryan C. Hendrickson for his constant support toward the 
completion of this work. Serving as my thesis advisor, your encouragement has been 
immeasurable. Due to your academic advice and occasional verve suggestion, I am 
happy to call this work my own. In addition, I would like to express my thanks to Dr. 
David Carwell and Dr. Andrew McNitt for their participation as members on my thesis 
committee. The time you spent reading through drafts and making suggestions have 
proven to be extremely helpful. I would like to sincerely thank my entire committee. 
I also want to express extreme gratitude for the many family and friends who 
called or stopped by to ask about my progress and make sure that I was keeping on 
schedule. Without your thoughtfulness I would not have finished this project. In 
particular, I would like to thank Tom Gilbert, Bill Pedersen, Traci Reiter, as well as my 
parents and grandparents. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IN"TRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY .......................... 6 
Literature Review .......................................................................... 6 
Methodology ............................................................................... 9 
Strengths and Weaknesses ............................................................... 16 
Explaining Small States ................................................................. 18 
CHAPTER 2: SMALL-STATE VOTIN"G ALLIANCES AT THE U.N .................. 21 
Introduction ............................................................................... 21 
United Nations Voting Behavior ......................................................... 22 
US-Cuban Relations ...................................................................... 23 
Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................... 25 
Territories/Colonial Issues .............................................................. 27 
Human Rights ............................................................................ 28 
Middle Eastern Conflicts ................................................................ 30 
Combined Analysis ...................................................................... 32 
Conclusion ................................................................................ 35 
CHAPTER 3: THE ENVIRONMENT: SMALL-STATE 
FOREIGN POLICY AND IN"TERNA TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ...................... 36 
Introduction ............................................................................... 36 
Alliance of Small Island States ......................................................... 38 
The Kyoto Protocol. ..................................................................... 42 
Pacific Island Forum ..................................................................... 50 
Conclusion ................................................................................ 60 
CHAPTER 4: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SMALL ISLAND STATE IN" 
THE INDIAN OCEAN ............................................................................ 63 
Introduction ............................................................................... 63 
History of Mauritius ...................................................................... 63 
The Environment. ........................................................................ 65 
Iraq ......................................................................................... 68 
Diego Garcia .............................................................................. 71 
Conclusion ................................................................................. 74 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ................................................................... 76 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 81 
SMALL-STATE FOREIGN POLICY: 
AN ANALYSIS OF KIRIBATI, NAURU, PALAU, TONGA, 
TUVALU AND MAURITIUS 
INTRODUCTION 
The academic research concerning small-state foreign policy is quite extensive. In 
general, this literature suggests that acquiescent relationships usually exist in some form 
or another when small and large powers interact on a multinational level. Indeed, most 
analysts concur that small states align with major powers on issues of foreign policy. The 
purpose of this thesis, consequently, is to determine whether or not similar relationships 
might be occurring between small island states located in the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
and some of the world's major powers. In essence, this thesis analyzes the actual foreign 
policy behavior of six small island states in order to determine whether they are truly 
seeking alliances with larger states so that they can protect their vulnerabilities. The six 
small states being examined are (in alphabetical order): the Republic of Kiribati 
(hereafter Kiribati), Mauritius, the Republic of Nauru (hereafter Nauru), Palau, The 
Kingdom of Tonga (hereafter Tonga) and Tuvalu. The major powers are: Australia, 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The regions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans were chosen for analysis for four 
basic reasons. First, there is little scholarly research concerning the areas of the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans and this represents an under-examined aspect for the study of 
international relations. Without a doubt, this lack of information necessitates further 
examination if foreign policy is to be better understood. Second, these regions were 
selected for their collective value. By taking previous theories of small-state foreign 
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policy and testing them against the policies of six island states, it should possible to 
determine the varying degrees to which such theories are accurate for some of the world's 
smallest powers. Third, all states included in this thesis were selected due to their 
growing membership in international organizations such as the United Nations. To be 
sure, the recent political activity by Mauritius as well as the five Pacific states should 
prove to be innovative for this study. The fact that all five Pacific states are recent 
inductees to the UN was a major factor in the selection process. Mauritius was chosen 
not only because of its former role with the UN Security Council, but also because it 
represents a different part of the world and different cultural structure than the five 
Pacific examples. By including Mauritius it will be possible to compare the findings 
from the Pacific examples with a country that has had much more experience with 
foreign policy. Lastly, the states chosen for this study each add a sense of uniqueness 
simply because of their smallness. In other words, it is important not to overlook small 
states simply because they seem to be disassociated or weak. Rather, this thesis focuses 
on the actual foreign policy of small states in order to determine whether they have their 
own agendas, or whether they tend to align with larger states on issues of foreign policy. 
Though studies concerning small state foreign policy often get caught in semantic 
debates about the ambiguities of terms such as "small" and "large", this thesis will focus 
more pointedly on the substantive data surrounding the issue. Despite the fact that 
attention will be paid to the definition of "small states", more focus will be given to the 
types of international relationships that these states are forming. Indeed, terminology is 
important. But, what is more important for the purpose of this thesis is a thorough 
examination of foreign policy, with an emphasis on whether or not alliances are forming 
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between small and large states. Thus, it should be sufficient to merely build from 
previous definitions when it comes to small states. 
Concerning the methodology for this thesis, both quantitative and case study 
analyses will be employed. In general, quantitative methods will be used to analyze 
United Nations voting behavior for some of the newest Oceanic inductees. After which, 
case studies will be used to illuminate some of the more pressing foreign policy choices 
identified from the quantitative analysis (e.g., the environment and the situation in Iraq). 
The value in using both quantitative and qualitative methods is that differing approaches 
will likely yield different insights into the foreign policy directions for the six states at 
hand. 
To outline the framework of this thesis, the first chapter will review previous 
literature on the issue of small-state foreign policy in order to gain a better understanding 
of the topic. This chapter will assist in the formulation of hypotheses for the remaining 
chapters. Among other central concepts, the theory that small states are likely to align 
with larger states on decisions of foreign policy will emerge in this chapter. In addition, 
the first chapter will explain the methodologies that will be used throughout the thesis, 
while also expounding upon some of the strengths and weaknesses that might arise from 
conducting such a study. It is quite evident that concerns such as state selection, as well 
as issue selection, are important for any study of foreign policy. 
The second chapter will include a quantitative analysis, comparing bivariate 
correlations between the five Pacific states and the four Western powers, in order to 
analyze whether voting alliances are forming at the UN's General Assembly. In essence, 
this chapter will give some insight into the validity of previous research, while also 
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suggesting some issues that necessitate further examination. The analysis in chapter two 
covers a broad range of issues, including (but not limited to) votes on environmental 
protection, Middle Eastern conflicts and the US-Cuba dilemma. Though informative, this 
chapter is limited in its capabilities of demonstrating some of the subtleties which often 
lead to decisions in foreign policy. Thus, the remaining chapters further investigate some 
of the nuances that could not be included within the quantitative methods of this chapter. 
The third chapter will examine the issue of small-state foreign policy through an 
environmental lens. The environment was chosen for further analysis because of the 
importance it has for the small island states in this study. The vulnerability of small 
island ecosystems makes the environment one of the most salient points of interest for 
small-state foreign policy. By examining various international organizations, as well as 
strategic policy initiatives, chapter three will shed some light onto how the selected states 
interact with the rest of the world in regards to global environmental policy. Particular 
subject matters that will be examined in this chapter include the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the Kyoto Protocol, and statements made 
to the United Nation's General Assembly and Security Council. After examining the 
policy activity that the selected states have produced over the past few years, it will 
become clear to what extent they are/are not aligning with larger states on issues of the 
environment. Case study will be the principle methodology for chapter three. 
In transition from the previous chapters, the fourth chapter will conduct an issue-
specific case study dealing solely with Mauritius. The focus will remain on whether or 
not alliances are forming with larger states on issues of foreign policy, but this chapter 
will not include any of the five Pacific states. Mauritius was chosen for this chapter in 
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order to balance the breakdown of this thesis which focuses heavily on the Pacific region. 
Mauritius has previously served on the UN Security Council and has been a UN member 
for over thirty-five years, making it quite different than the five Pacific states in terms of 
foreign policy opportunities. Though the regional shift from the Pacific to the Indian 
Ocean seems somewhat stark, Mauritius' status as a small state certainly allows for an 
opportunity to examine what was learned from the Pacific examples in a different part of 
the world. The specific issues through which Mauritius' foreign policy will be examined 
include: the environment, the situation in Iraq, and the disputed territory of Diego 
Garcia. 
In sum, by using data gathered from the United Nations' General Assemblies, 
qualitative data covering small state involvement in international organizations, as well as 
the policy behavior of Mauritius, this thesis will examine foreign policy in two distinct 
parts of the world. The objective of this thesis is to test whether theories that have been 
generally accepted in other parts of the world hold true for the six small island states at 
hand. By using a framework of small-state foreign policy, it should be possible to gain a 
better understanding of how these states will interact in a global milieu. 
5 
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A large portion of past research into small-state foreign policy has focused on defining 
exactly what constitutes a small state (Liska 1968; Osgood 1968; East 1975). Many 
definitions have been constructed, but certainly none have gone undisputed. In due 
course, however, semantics have forced scholars to delineate between small and large 
states. Some of the definitions are concerned with a state's size and population (Vital 
1967). Others are more abstract and are concerned with issues of political power and the 
formation of alliances (Rothstein 1968), while some are purely interested in the systemic 
roles that state leaders create for their countries (Keohane 1969). Conversely, even 
though this thesis will discuss small-state foreign policy, its purpose is not to create a 
definition by which states can be measured. Rather, alliance formation and small state 
foreign policy behavior will be the focus of this work, with only a brief section 
explaining why the selected states are considered to be small in stature. 
In addition to the sometimes contested definitions of size, many leading scholars 
on small state foreign policy (Vital 1967; Rothstein 1968; Keohane 1969; Singer 1972; 
Katzenstein 1985; East 1975; Vayrynen 1983; Espindola 1987; Sutton 1987; Sanders 
1989; Breuning 1995; Elman 1995; Hey 2002) also debate whether or not small states are 
willing to engage in "high-risk behavior" (East 1975, 568), or if they are simply pawns in 
a hegemonic system. As a result of these discussions, however, the research has varied 
so drastically that it can be difficult to decipher the importance of small states in the area 
of foreign policy. For example, do small states only seek alliances for the external 
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protection, which then allows them to focus on internal issues (Krebs 1999)? Or, do 
small states actually help influence global change and/or transform the fate of 
international organizations by giving their verbal/electoral support (East 1973)? 
Yet, the very existence of these questions demonstrate that the literature on small-
state foreign policy has been extremely cognizant of the influence that security issues can 
have for the construction of interstate amity. In other words, much research of small state 
foreign policy has stressed alliance formation (Liska 1968; Osgood 1968; Rothstein 
1968). For example, as Rothstein (1968) noted, the extent to which small states seek 
alliances often helps define their status as "small powers". But, as stated earlier, scholars 
such as Krebs (1999) have countered Rothstein's argument with the idea that weak states 
simply seek alliances in order to clear their agendas for regional concerns, making 
themselves important players in the international system. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
refute that these arguments generally center on the idea that small-state foreign policy is 
riddled with alliance formation. In short, few scholars debate whether or not these 
alliances are actually occurring. Rather, the question seems to be why they are occurring. 
Beyond the discourse of alliance formation and the semantic squabbles that 
attempt to define small states, another major trend in the literature concerning small-state 
foreign policy is that it usually considers only Caribbean, European and African 
examples (Julien 1992; Zahariadis 1994; Breuning 1995; Sanders 1997; Krebs 1999; Hey 
2002). This regional bias, in tum, means that many of the world's small states are simply 
omitted from discussion and systemic analyses. For example, with the exception of a few 
works (Anckar 2002; Avery 1990; Anckar, and Anckar 1995; Anckar and Anckar 2000; 
Reilly 2000), South Pacific foreign policy has gone largely undocumented by scholars of 
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the social sciences. This dearth of research undoubtedly represents a major void for the 
field of international relations. 
Indeed, when small states such as those in the Pacific are considered, the topic is 
usually concerned with economic growth (Armstrong, and Read 2003) or the 
vulnerability of island nations (East 1999). Rarely does an issue such as Pacific foreign 
policy appear in the literature. Though some diplomats such as Hong (2002)1 have begun 
to note the significance that these states can have in groups like the United Nations, such 
viewpoints are not commonly reported. Indeed, there are few scholarly reports telling of 
foreign policy in locations such as the Pacific and Indian oceans. The result is that 
regional organizations like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Pacific 
Island Forum (PIF) are often overlooked. 
Considering the previous literature, which suggests that small states will often 
seek alliances with larger states, as well as some of the more recent studies concerning 
small island vulnerability, this thesis examines the type of foreign policy that small states 
create in two distinct regions of the world. In a pragmatic sense, this thesis analyzes the 
actual foreign policy behavior of five small island states in the region of Oceania, as well 
as the country of Mauritius, in an attempt to determine whether the selected states are 
actually seeking alliances with larger states in order to protect their vulnerabilities. 
In conclusion, the fact that small states are so strongly represented in 
organizations like the UN (with the majority of UN membership coming from states 
considered to be small), their presence necessitates attention. By examining the six states 
at hand, it should be possible to better understand the foreign policy of small island 
1 Mark Hong is the Director of the International Organizations and Developing Countries Directorate in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, also holding diplomatic posts in Europe and Asia. 
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states, while ultimately illustrating their roles within international organizations. 
Consequently, the following chapters will attempt to shed some light on five of the 
United Nation's newest Pacific members -Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu, as 
well as a former member of the UN's Security Council- the East African island state of 
Mauritius. 
Methodology 
First of all, in order to conduct this study, the method behind the selection of the states 
must be articulated. Indeed, the selection process is one of the most crucial aspects for 
any study considering small-state foreign policy. As this chapter will further explain, a 
rubric must be created for measuring and declaring a state to be "small". Though many 
explanations have been given for what makes a state small, this thesis will combine some 
of the more fundamental classifications to explain why Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Mauritius should all be considered in such a way. 
What is more, it is also extremely important for a study of small-state foreign 
policy to consider the selection of states. In other words, a study of small-state foreign 
policy that selects states simply because they are small will not guarantee an accurate 
representation of all small states. Indeed, regional, and even interregional, variations 
must be considered. 
The primary reason that the five Pacific states in this study were selected was 
because of their status as newly inducted members in the UN. Tuvalu was inducted into 
the UN in 2000, Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga all gained admittance in 1999, and Palau was 
admitted in 1994 (United Nations 2003b ). The second reason for their selection is 
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because each of the five states is located in the region of Oceania. The regional 
similarities, as well as their newfound capacity to make decisions within the UN 
represent substantial grounds for the five Pacific states to be included in this thesis. In 
addition, the island of Mauritius was selected due to its relatively small size and because 
of its recent position on the UN Security Council. Mauritius was elected for a two-year 
term with the council, commencing January 1, 2001 and ending December 31, 2002 (UN 
2003c ). In essence, Mauritius represents a unique research opportunity for the study of 
small-state foreign policy behavior, where a wealth of information exists. By selecting 
small states that have either recently been inducted into the UN, or have previously held 
prestigious positions with the organization, it will be possible to gain valuable insight into 
some of the policymaking mechanisms of such states. Also, because the states selected 
for this study are pluralist democracies a reasonably sound comparison should be 
possible.2 And, finally, the selection of states for this study had much to do with the 
cultural similarities arising from their status as small states. Because it is often difficult 
to compare specific aspects of Melanesian, Micronesian, Polynesian and Indian Ocean 
cultures, this study instead examines the roles of foreign policy. While the five Pacific 
states, as well as Mauritius, have seemingly dealt with the remnants of a colonial era, 
their current political, business and religious structures all indicate that they are currently 
more similar than ever (Strathem et al. 2002). 
Next, it is important to also define what is meant by alliance formation. As each 
chapter analyzes a somewhat different aspect of foreign policy, alliances between small 
2 According to Freedom House rankings for democracy, the only one of the six states at hand that did not 
have a highly democratic democracy in the year 2003 was Tonga. With a hereditary monarchy and a 
democratically elected parliament, Tonga nonetheless ranks as a democratic state. For more information on 
democratic rankings, see http://www.worldpolicy.org/globalrights/democracy/table-pr.html. 
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and large states must have a definition whereby they can be wholly understood. For 
example, while chapter two analyzes voting records, alliances will simply be judged via 
correlation tests. However, as the subsequent chapters deal with case studies, it will not 
be possible to define alliances by quantitative measures. Thus, it is necessary to define 
the terms that will be used. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the definition for the word alliance will be similar 
to the one brought forth by Keohane ( 1969), in his review of four prominent works within 
the field of international relations. It was noted by Keohane (1969: 300-301) that 
"special ties" which bring two states together is what should define alliances. Indeed, 
Keohane also notes that confusion often arises when deciding which special ties should 
be considered. For example, Osgood (1968) argues that the special ties between small 
and large states must consider military agreements. This thesis, however, is not so 
precise. Rather, this thesis, expounds on Keohane's broader exception of alliances, 
allowing for many different kinds of ties. The definition for the term "alliance" that this 
thesis will represent simply takes into account the works of five leading scholars on the 
subject (Keohane 1969; Liska 1968; Osgood 1968; Rothstein 1968; Vital 1967). In all, 
four characteristics are outlined in this definition, which are: aggregation of power, 
interallied control or restraint of allies, promotion of international order, and internal 
security (Keohane 1969: 301). Thus, when the case studies of chapters three and four 
consider alliance formation, they will reflect the boundaries that these four characteristics 
create. In a pragmatic sense, in order to exist, an alliance must contain some aspect set 
forth by this definition. 
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As these categories might seem somewhat overarching, the purpose of this thesis 
is merely to examine the types of relationships that six small states have recently formed 
with some of the world's largest powers. It is not the purpose of this thesis to 
dichotomize foreign policy in a way that would overlook important areas of policy for 
small states. The following will further explain how each chapter will specifically 
analyze the data that was gathered. 
By using simple correlation output testing, chapter two examines small-state 
foreign policy behavior with an analysis of voting records. Concerning the data 
collection and research methods, the second chapter will include research gathered over 
the past three years. The overall data will consist of voting records from General 
Assembly Resolutions, which cover many diverse issues. The particular states that will 
be considered in this chapter include: Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu.3 
Due to the large amount of Resolutions that the UN enacts each year, it would not 
be feasible to include voting records for every motion. Thus, the particular issues that 
chapter two includes in its analysis are: human rights, Middle Eastern conflicts, nuclear 
proliferation, colonial issues, and US relations with Cuba. Without a doubt, the UN is 
faced with a larger agenda than these issues represent, but for the purpose of analyzing 
small state foreign policy, these topics are nonetheless diverse in nature, and should 
ultimately remain sufficient for identifying common trends in small-state voting 
behavior. 
3 Palau was the first of the five states in this study to enter the United Nations, being inducted in 1994 
(United Nations 2003b). Consequently, merely analyzing resolutions from the past three years will 
underrepresent Palau's ten-year UN history. However, in order to incfode as much information as possible 
from Tuvalu's short history in UN, while at the same time representing each state equitably, it is important 
to begin as close as possible to the year 2000, which was when Tuvalu gained admission to the UN (United 
Nations 2003d). 
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The data will reflect voting records from the 56t\ 57th and 5gth General 
Assemblies at the United Nations. The framework will compare equivalent voting results 
from the five Pacific states and Australia, France, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. There were three basic reasons why the comparison states (e.g., the US, 
France, Australia and the UK) were chosen. The first reason is because they were all, at 
one time or another, in direct control over at least one of the Pacific states at hand 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2003). The second reason is because these states represent 
three major regions of the world; the Pacific, Europe and North America (CIA, 2003). 
The final reason for choosing these states was that the US, France and the UK are all 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Australia is often considered the 
major power in the Pacific region. In order to effectively analyze alliances between small 
and large states, these countries should represent a solid base for comparison (e.g., large 
states). 
Regarding this analysis, the two Pacific states with the most actual votes for each 
issue will be included in the individual analyses. Since the Pacific states sometimes do 
not vote on certain issues, sample sizes would be too small to include each state in each 
analysis. 4 However, each Pacific state will be considered in the final portion of this 
chapter, which will analyze all of the individual analyses in one overarching comparison 
of all selected issues. Simple percentages and correlation outputs will be a major data 
source for this chapter. 
All resolutions that ended with a vote were considered for inclusion. 
Furthermore, resolutions overlapping two issues will be considered in both sections. For 
4 For example, of the ninety-five Resolutions in chapter two, Kiribati, Palau and Tuvalu voted only 5 times, 
30 times and 34 times, respectively (United Nations 2003d). 
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example, if a resolution involved human rights in Iraq it will be included in the analysis 
of both human rights and Iraq, and will consequently be considered twice. However, if a 
resolution dealt with only one of the selected issues, it will be analyzed only once. A 
total of 93 different resolutions, with three being considered twice (e.g., in two different 
sections), were included in this chapter. 
In addition, because the Pacific states being analyzed frequently do not vote on 
issues at the UN, nothing will be recorded when a "no" vote was presented. Omitting 
such data will obviously reduce the overall sample, however it would not be appropriate 
to allow absent votes to sway the general correlations. Abstentions will, however, be 
included as a recorded vote. 
As far as defining the formation of alliances, both simple percentages and 
strengths of correlation between the Pacific states and the Western powers will be 
considered. In other words, the more similar two states are in terms of UN voting 
behavior, the stronger the alliance will be measured. Obviously, correlations of .50 and 
above will be considered to have more potential for alliance formation than would a 
negative relationship. However, for the most part, relationships will need to have a 
Pearson correlate above .70 to be considered as having a considerable effect. In addition, 
when correlation outputs are conducted, only statistically significant relationships5 will 
be considered. 
In transition, chapter three will then expand on the data gathered in chapter two 
by closely examining how Pacific states actually participate in the foreign policy arena of 
a specific issue: the environment. Chapter three analyzes how Pacific states interact 
within international organizations which address the environment. The specific 
5 Statistical Significance will be measured at p = .05 or less. 
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organizations that chapter three examines are the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS), the UN General Assembly and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). AOSIS, 
possibly the most influential organization in this chapter, has a membership which 
includes all five of the Pacific states as well as Mauritius. The purpose of chapter three is 
to pragmatically examine the results from chapter two. 
Chapter three will diverge from chapter two methodologically insomuch that 
foreign policy speeches and statements will serve as the principal data for determining 
whether or not alliances are forming between small and large states. The methods in this 
chapter will be exploratory in nature, reporting on the activity that small states have 
within multiple international organizations. Alliance formation will be judged in chapter 
three by analyzing the types of policies that the small states are advocating through their 
organizations. More specifically, organizational reports, speeches and other official 
documents will be the principal determinant as to whether alliances are forming between 
the small and large states. 
The fourth chapter will diverge somewhat starkly from the two previous 
insomuch that the focus of analysis is transferred to the island state of Mauritius. 
However, the overarching theme will remain. The analysis of alliance formation will be 
the same, with only the regional focus changing. Again, the fact that very little attention 
has been given to Mauritius in terms of foreign policy necessitates such a chapter. The 
question is whether Mauritius' policy is unique, or whether it merely falls into line with 
the assumptions gathered from the literature review. This chapter will help illuminate 
some of Mauritius foreign policy behaviors. 
15 
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Though the UN Security Council takes positions on a host of issues, this analysis 
of Mauritius will focus on only three specific areas. The issues through which Mauritius 
will be examined include: the environment, the war/conflict in Iraq, and their dispute 
with the British over the island of Diego Garcia. These areas of consideration are 
sufficient for this examination for several reasons. First, analyzing how a small island 
state, which is extremely vulnerable to climatic conditions, reacts to the environmental 
policy of large states, should give a sense for overall policy behavior. Second, the 
conflict in Iraq has recently been of particular importance for the UN Security Council. 
And, as a former member of the UN Security Council, Mauritius should have a particular 
interest in forming policy on the subject. By analyzing this issue, it should become 
apparent as to whether or not Mauritius is aligning/diverging from the world's largest 
states with regards to an issue that is quite different from environmental protection. 
Third, analyzing the dispute that Mauritius has with Britain over Diego Garcia should 
give useful insight into how it behaves when it has an individual disagreement with a 
large state. Approaching foreign policy behavior in three different ways, this section 
substantively adds to the research insomuch that a wide range of issues are discussed and 
analyzed. 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
Considering the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis, one potential limitation lies in its 
explanation of what creates a small state. The obvious counter for this argument, 
however, is that merely reporting the research of many scholars within the field of 
political science gives a very strong representation of the differing opinions on the topic. 
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Ultimately, it would seem somewhat superfluous to create a new theory behind what 
makes a state either small or large. Drafting a workable solution from previous research 
should be more than sufficient. 
Another possible drawback is rooted in chapter two, wherein length of UN 
membership (as well as voting histories) is relatively short. The only way to compensate 
for this, however, would be to add additional data from the states that have been members 
of the UN for longer periods of time. Yet, in doing so, chapter two would lose much of 
the uniqueness that comes from analyzing such new members, as well as it regional 
focus. Moreover, by studying new inductees, it might be possible to get a sense of 
alliance formation at its early stages. 
The most significant weakness from chapter three lies in its inability to account 
for every single international organization to which each of the six states belong. There 
are undoubtedly more international organizations to which the six small states in this 
analysis are members. However, in support of chapter three's strengths, limiting this 
study to a manageable size makes the conclusions more comprehensive. Thus, by 
including the international organizations, where data exist, this chapter has the potential 
for determining whether alliances are forming with regards to one very salient topic (e.g., 
the environment). 
Finally, a concluding weakness that exists in this thesis comes from its mixing of 
foreign policy between Pacific states and Mauritius. Ultimately, the fact that Mauritius is 
in a different region of the world than the Pacific states creates some comparative 
limitations. Most notably, the differences of political agendas between islands in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans are varied due to their regional influences. However, as was 
17 
Ethridge 
previously explained, the fact that all six states can be easily defined as "small" reflects 
sufficient justification for their combination. Also, the fact that past studies have created 
a dearth of information on these states necessitates a comprehensive examination. 
Though more states could easily be included in this analysis, the six states at hand should 
be sufficient for analyzing whether or not alliances actually form between some of the 
world's smallest states and their larger more powerful counterparts. 
With regards to the relative strengths of this thesis, by applying leading theories 
of political alliances and small state foreign policy (see, for example, Rothstein 1968; 
Vital 1969), it should become possible to test theories that have been largely accepted but 
rarely applied to Mauritius and five states in the Pacific region. In addition to testing 
theories, this paper will use the collected data to make inferences into the types of 
alliances that might have potential for the future. 
Explaining Small States 
As was just noted, one possible weakness for any small-state analysis lies in the 
fundamental dilemma of what constitutes a small state. Depending on what one uses to 
measure small states, it might be true that there are only a few super powers in the world, 
thus making all other states small by comparison. However, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, the six states being examined are indeed small by almost any explanation of 
the word. 
As has already been stated, there are many different ways in which small states 
can be defined. However, the defining characteristics for this study will simply include: 
physical size, population and economic capability. If this logic is accepted, then it stands 
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to reason that all five states being considered are indeed small. For example, as table 1 
demonstrates, the mean area for the five Pacific states is 413 Km Squared, the mean 
population is 50,000 inhabitants and the mean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an 
annual US $112 million. Additionally, Mauritius has an area of only 2,040 Km Squared, 
a GDP of 13. 85 billion, and a population of 1,220,481. Though size, economic 
capabilities, and population are not the only characteristics for measuring states, they are 
cited as being contributing factors often enough in the literature that they should be 
sufficient for drawing a similar conclusion. Indeed, given the data from Tables 1 and 2, 
few people would argue that the six states at hand are anything but small. 
Table 1 
Kiribati 
Nauru 
Palau 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
MEAN SCORE= 
Standard Deviation= 
N= 
Area 
(Km Sq.) 
811 
21 
458 
748 
26 
----------------
413 
380 
5 
Explanation of Small Pacific States 
Population 
(In thousands) 
99 
13 
20 
108 
11 
-------------------
50 
49 
5 
Note: Data developed from the Central Intelligence Agency (2003) 
http: //Vvww. odci. gov I cia/pub lications/factbook/ index. html. 
Table 2 
Mauritius 
Area 
(Km Sq.) 
2,040 
Explanation of Mauritius' Size 
Population 
(In millions) 
1.220 
Note: Data developed from the Central Intelligence Agency (2003) 
http://-www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.htrnl. 
GDP 
(In $U.S. millions) 
79 
60 
174 
236 
12 
--------------------
112 
91 
5 
GDP 
(In $U.S. billions) 
13.85 
In simple terms, the mean area for the five Pacific states in Table 1 is barely more 
than twice the size of Washington D.C., their mean population is almost one/six 
thousandth when compared to that of the United States, and their mean GDP is 
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practically incomparable to the US's 10.4 trillion equivalent.6 Concerning Table 2, 
Mauritius is only eleven times the size of Washington D.C., has a GDP equal to less than 
one/six hundredth of the US's, and has little more than one inhabitant for every two 
hundred and fifty American citizens (CIA 2003). Regardless of the starting point, these 
statistics are fairly convincing insomuch that the six states being examined are generally 
small in size, population and economic capabilities. As has already been stated, defining 
these states as small is not the fundamental purpose of this thesis. But, failing to note 
such characteristics in the methods section would prove to be problematic for the 
remainder of this work. Indeed, it is important to realize that the states at hand are quite 
small compared to some of the world's larger states. 
6 The US GDP is approximately ninety three thousand times larger than the mean GDP for Kiribati, Nauru, 
Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu (CIA 2003). 
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CHAPTER2 
SMALL-STATE VOTING 
ALLIANCES AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
Ethridge 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the type of voting behavior that five new 
inductees to the United Nations General Assembly have exemplified throughout their 
short histories with the organization. Thus, it is first important to briefly note some of the 
basic functions of the General Assembly, so that further examination of individual 
members can be better understood. 
To begin, becoming members in the UN General Assembly is often thought of as 
something that states do in order to promote goodwill, peace and justice. However, it has 
been noted, and well documented, that many states join and participate in the Assembly 
so that they might be able to care for their own values, needs, and interests (Weiss, 
Forsythe, Coate 1994). While this chapter does not make the argument that small states 
are disinterested in peace and justice, it does begin with the assumption that small states 
do, at the very least, have their own agendas within the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly has often been described by catchphrases such as the 
"Global Parliament," the "Town Meeting of the World," and even the "Sun of the UN 
Solar System" (Ziring, Riggs, Plano 2000). All of which help explain the reason why the 
Assembly was chosen for analysis in this chapter. In a word, egalitarianism defines the 
UN General Assembly and makes it a unique point of departure for any study concerning 
alliance formation. Indeed, of the six principal UN organs 7, the General Assembly is the 
only one wherein all member states are given equal representation. Members of the 
7 The six organs include the Economic and Social Council, General Assembly, the International Court of 
Justice, the Secretariat, the Security Council, and the Trusteeship Council (Ziring, Riggs, Plano 2000). 
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Assembly are quasi-legislative insomuch that they create resolutions, declarations, and 
participate in conferences. To be sure, the Assembly resembles the lawmaking divisions 
of many national legislatures. Also, through its capabilities to create multinational 
treaties (i.e., lawmaking), the Assembly has the power to influence the decisions of the 
entire international community. 
Moreover, as votes coming from small and large powers are measured equally; 
the General Assembly gives all states the opportunity to have their voice be heard. 
Because each member state is given the same amount of voting opportunities, it would be 
difficult to proclaim that any one state, regardless of size, has a serious advantage in the 
Assembly. Ultimately, the egalitarianism of the General Assembly is particularly 
important for this chapter. As much of the literature concerning small-state foreign 
policy suggests that alliance formation is commonplace, the egalitarianism of the UN's 
General Assembly creates a different scenario. 
United Nations Voting Behavior 
After accepting that the five Pacific states being considered are, in fact, small by 
measures of size, population and economic potential, it then becomes possible to 
transition into a substantive analysis of small state foreign policy. As noted in the 
literature review, the policy of small states is often characterized via alliances with larger 
states. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter analyzes whether the states of 
Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu are forming strategic alliances with four major 
Western powers at the UN. 
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As was briefly noted in the methodology section, the data will reflect voting 
records from the 56t\ 5ih and 58th General Assemblies of the United Nations, and will be 
analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The framework will compare results from 
the five Pacific states with the equivalent voting records from the US, France, Australia 
and the UK. Regarding this analysis, the two Pacific states with the most actual votes for 
each issue will be included in the individual analyses, with all five states being 
considered in the final analysis. 
The particular issues to be analyzed are: human rights (including the situation in 
Iraq and the situation in the Congo), Middle Eastern conflicts (including Iraqi, Iranian, 
Palestinian and Israeli situations), colonial issues (including colonialism in the Pacific), 
and the US-Cuban situation. Concerning the number of Resolutions in each category, the 
US-Cuba issue considers only three, the issue of territories/colonies considers ten, the 
issue of nuclear power considers thirteen, the human right section considers twenty-three, 
and the Middle Eastern section considers forty. Due to relatively small sample sizes, 
some issues will be necessarily considered in a qualitative manner leaving correlation 
outputs for the issues with larger sample sizes. As far as defining the formation of 
alliances, both simple percentages and strengths of correlation between the Pacific states 
and the Western powers will be considered. 
US-Cuban Relations 
The US-Cuban concern was chosen for this study because there was at least one 
Resolution on the issue from each of the three Assemblies being analyzed. Also, it seems 
that looking at an issue that directly affects one of the comparison states (e.g., the US), 
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this should be a potentially good indicator as to whether any of the Pacific states are 
taking sides with a major power. 
By qualitatively analyzing the voting records from the three resolutions 
concerning US-Cuban relations over a three-year period, it becomes possible to see that 
none of the Pacific states supported the US in their voting behavior.8 In fact, as voting 
records show, it is very rare that all five states vote on a particular issue,9 but in the 5gth 
Assembly there was a vote present from each island nation, and none were in alignment 
with the US in terms of keeping Cuban embargos in place (UN, 2003d). Thus, it seems 
that at least for the issue concerning the US ending its economic, commercial and 
financial embargos with Cuba, the five Pacific states have not formed a political alliance 
with the US. Though, it should also be noted that France, the UK and Australia all voted 
contra the US (UN, 2003d), making it unanimous amongst all the states being considered, 
except the US, that the trade embargos against Cuba should be ended. 
What this demonstrates is that ifthere is any sort of alliance being formed by the 
Pacific states with regards to the Cuban embargo, it is certainly not occurring with the 
US. As the five Pacific states in this study are certainly not the only countries in the 
world to vote against the US on this issue, however, these results cannot be considered 
conclusive by themselves. Rather, the most logical conclusion to come from these three 
votes is simply that the Pacific states, France, the UK and Australia have all seemingly 
agreed on what measures should be taken with regards to the US-Cuban embargo. What 
is somewhat surprising about these results is that out of all the comparison states, the US 
8 The bibliographic information for the three resolutions is: AIRES/56/9, AIRES/57/11 and AIRES/58/7 
(United Nations, 2003d). 
9 Of the ninety-five resolutions considered, this was the only one that had a vote present from all five states. 
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could probably offer the most military protection.10 Yet, an alliance between the Pacific 
states and the US is not what seems to be occurring. Without a doubt, this is one of the 
most important findings of this section, as the five new inductees have shown their 
unwavering willingness to vote against the foreign policy of the US. 
This analysis is meaningful not only because it shows voting behavior over a 
three-year period, but it also includes votes from all five Pacific states. But, as was 
already eluded, due to the fact that there were only three resolutions on the topic of US-
Cuban relations, the results are by no means conclusive. Rather, what seems most useful 
at this point is to add to these findings by analyzing resolutions which concern a broader 
range of issues, and will ultimately boost the overall sample size. By doing so it should 
then be possible to see whether or not the Pacific states remain in alliance with France, 
the UK and Australia, while opposing the US on other issues. This should ultimately 
define whether the votes on US-Cuban relations were merely a trend, or if they are 
constant result. 
Nuclear Weapons 
Issues of nuclear weaponry generally grab the attention of all states in the world. Due to 
the devastating effect that nuclear warfare poses, it seems that small states would either 
want to rid the world of all nuclear arms, or simply take sides with those who possess the 
weapons (e.g., form alliances). After analyzing UN resolutions, it seems that Pacific 
states are no exception. Of the five Pacific nations in this study, Tonga and Nauru were 
the only two states that voted with any sort of frequency on issues of nuclear weapons. 
10 The US presence in countries such as Guam and America Samoa (CIA, 2003), as well as having the 
world's largest military budget (CIA, 2003) both suggest that the US would be the most ready source for 
military protection in the Pacific. 
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Thus, they will be compared separately with the four Western states to determine if 
alliances were being formed with regards to their views on nuclear weaponry. 
Concerning nuclear potential, there were twenty votes considered from the three 
Assemblies, and the results show that Tonga and Nauru voted in agreement with each 
other sixteen times (UN, 2003d). This is an eighty percent agreement between the two 
most frequently voting Pacific states in the study. 11 In all, Nauru voted for nuclear 
disarmament ninety percent of the time, and Tonga voted for disarmament eighty-five 
percent of the time. This relationship seemed to be the strongest overall voting alliance 
for the Pacific states. The Western states of France, the UK, the US and Australia only 
voted for nuclear disarmament 5%, 30%, 30% and 30% of the time, respectively. 
Obviously it appears that Tonga and Tuvalu are not on the same side as any of the larger 
states with respect to nuclear weaponry. 
The results show that Tonga and Nauru are voting in alliance with one another. 
But, in contrast to the US-Cuban votes, they did not take the side of any of the large 
states. Rather Tonga and Nauru voted against the large states, only forming an internal 
alliance between themselves. Though this analysis only shows voting trends for one 
particular issue, it nevertheless demonstrates a clear pattern of the small states voting 
against the major powers. It will be most useful at this point to analyze Pacific voting 
behavior on yet another issue to determine whether this finding holds constant. The next 
section will discuss the existence of alliances on territory/colonial concerns. 
11 Of the twenty Resolutions, Kiribati only voted for four times, Palau did not vote at all, and Tuvalu voted 
only once. 
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Territories/Colonial Issues 
Given the Pacific experience of being highly colonized, this issue seems to be of extreme 
salience. In other words, if Pacific states vote in alliance with Western powers 
concerning issues that have had a great impact in the region, it would stand to reason that 
there would be a strong case for overall alliance formation. For issues concerning 
territories and colonial issues, the two Pacific states that had the highest amount of votes 
were Tonga and Tuvalu. Of the ten Resolutions concerning this issue, Tonga voted a 
total of eight times, with seven "yes" votes in favor of granting independence to non-self 
governing territories, and the other an abstention (United Nations 2003d). Tuvalu, 
similarly, had only five votes, all of which were "yes" votes (2003d). Interpreting these 
data seems fairly simple in that they tend to suggest congruence between Tonga and 
Tuvalu's voting behaviors. Even though the two countries did not vote the same amount 
of times, there was only one difference in their voting behavior, and that was in the form 
of an abstention. 
By comparing the results of these two countries with the four Western states, it 
seems that the only country that could even be considered to have been in an alliance 
with Tonga and Tuvalu was Australia. Australia was certainly out-spoken against 
decolonization, voting in favor of granting independence to colonies for all ten votes 
(United Nations 2003d). None of the other major powers made a "yes" vote for any one 
of the ten Resolutions (2003d). France abstained on all ten Resolutions (2003d). The US 
abstained four times, and voted against the other six Resolutions (2003d). And the UK 
abstained six times, and voted against decolonization four times (2003d). 
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In general what the Resolutions concerning decolonization tend to suggest is that 
there is again alliances forming between Pacific states, but that this time Australia is also 
is concordance with the views of the island nations. However, much like the previous 
sections, it should be conceded that these ten Resolutions are certainly not enough to 
make any definitive conclusions. Rather, when this information is coupled with the 
voting behavior on nuclear weaponry a clearer picture can begin to emerge. It seems that 
political alliances are not forming with the UN's newest Pacific inductees and some of 
the larger, more dominating nations of the world (with the exception of Australia voting 
to end decolonization). 
Human Rights 
There were twenty-three Resolutions in which human rights were voted upon for the 
three Assemblies being examined. In essence, all Resolutions that ended in a vote and 
had the words "Human Rights" or "Human Abuses" in its title were included in this 
discussion. One strong point for this section is that it has a relatively large sample size. 
Another is that of the twenty-three resolutions being considered, no sample state was 
accused of wrongdoing. Ultimately, this should create a non-biased platform for the 
analysis. 
The two Pacific states with the most amount of votes for this section were Nauru 
and Palau. Nauru had thirteen votes and Palau had fourteen (UN, 2003d). The totals for 
each country, however, were not conclusive for determining alliance formation, 
insomuch that neither tended to vote in any particular way. Thus, simply comparing 
percentages would not be extremely useful in making a decision on whether or not 
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alliances were forming. Rather, a simple bivariate correlation was determined to be more 
useful. And, as table 2 demonstrates, there are only three statistically significant 
correlations between Pacific states and the four W estem powers. 
The first significant correlation is between Nauru and the UK. As table 3 shows, 
this relation is significant at a ninety-five percent confidence level, and has a Pearson's 
correlate of .57, which illustrates an average relationship. The problem, however, is that 
the Pearson's correlate is suggesting a negative relationship. This information is tending 
to indicate that, in regards to human rights, Nauru is not forming any political alliances 
with the Western powers. Moreover, if Nauru is forming any statistically significant 
alliances concerning the issue of human rights they are probably opposite (i.e., negative) 
to the large powers. 
To further support the findings of the previous section, in which the Pacific states 
were only forming alliances with Australia and each other, Palau's strongest relationship 
is with Australia. Though Palau also has a statistically significant relationship with 
France in regards to voting on issues of human rights, the Pearson's correlation is no 
more than .567, which tends to demonstrate only a moderately strong relationship. 
However, Palau does show a Pearson's correlation of .881 for its relationship to 
Australia. 
T bl 3 a e C I t" fH orre a ion o uman 
I NAURU PALAU 
NAURU Pearson Correlation 1 .11 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.74 
N 13 12 
PALAU Pearson Correlation 
.11 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.74 
N 12 14 
Note: data developed from the United Nations -- 2003d. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
29 
USA 
-.34 
.26 
13 
.41 
.15 
14 
R' h v t U! ts o es 
FRANCE UK AUSTRALIA 
.05 -.57(*) .05 
.86 .04 I .88 
13 13 13 
.57(*) .27 .88(**) 
.03 .35 .00 
14 14 14 
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What the votes on human rights tend to suggest, more than anything else, is that 
the strongest alliance being formed is one between Palau and Australia. However, other 
than this relationship, the abovementioned correlations tend to illustrate very little for the 
existence of political alliances between the Pacific states and Western powers. Due to the 
fact that none of the states in this study are accused of having human rights violations 
(making the subject fairly neutral), and because there are twenty-three Resolutions 
included in the correlation output, these results leave very little to be disputed. However, 
by further examining one more issue, which will include a larger sample size, it should be 
even easier to determine whether political alliances are forming between the selected 
Pacific states and the four Western powers, or whether intrastate alliances between 
Pacific nations are more prevalent. 
Middle Eastern Conflicts 
The data in this section are the most robust in terms of sample size. Concerning the two 
Pacific states being considered, Nauru and Tonga had twenty-seven and twenty-four 
votes, respectively (United Nations 2003d). In terms of alliances, this is the first section 
in which one of the two Pacific states has seemingly voted in a way that aligns with any 
Western power other than Australia. For the first time, Tonga had a moderately strong 
correlation with both France and the UK. In fact, the only Western power that Tonga did 
not seem to build a correlation with was the US. As table 4 demonstrates, Tonga seemed 
to be very active in terms of voting for issues concerning the Middle East, and even 
appeared to be in sync with the voting behaviors of three Western Powers. Keeping with 
this analysis, however, it seems that Nauru did not vote in a pattern that reflected the 
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voting behavior of any other state. Also, in this section, contrary to previous sections, 
Nauru did not even form a voting alliance with the other Pacific nations. 
Table 4 Correlation of Middle Eastern Votes 
I NAURU TONGA 
NAURU Pearson 1 .05 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.86 
N 27 16 
TONGA Pearson 
.05 l Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.86 
N 16 24 
Note: data developed from the United Nations, 2003d. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
USA FRANCE 
-.12 .22 
.54 .27 
27 27 
-.18 .65(**) 
.41 .00 
24 24 
UK 
I .o9 
.66 
27 
.65(**) 
.00 
24 
What seems to be happening in terms of votes on Middle Eastern conflict is 
similar to what happened in the US-Cuban section. Though Nauru did not form an 
AUSTRALIA 
-.05 
.79 
27 
.71(**) 
1.00 
24 
alliance with anyone, Tonga seemingly tended toward every Western country except the 
US. According to Table 4, the correlations that Tonga had with the UK and France were 
moderately strong, coming just short of the initial . 70 standard, which this chapter 
considers to be a strong relationship. Additionally, Tonga's correlation with Australia is 
larger than the . 70 standard. Thus, it can be said that in terms of the Middle Eastern 
conflict, Tonga seems to be forming a voting alliance with Australia, and is on the verge 
of such a friendship with France and the UK. Again, this section tends to demonstrate 
that if any voting alliances are forming between the Pacific states, they are certainly not 
occurring with the US. Again, the confusion is in the fact that the US would probably be 
able to offer the most military protection and monetary assistance to the Pacific states, 
but there is little to no strength in these relationships. 
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Combined Analysis 
As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, this section deals specifically with the 
issue of alliance formation between all five Pacific states and all four Western powers. 
Whereas the other sections selected only the two Pacific countries with the most votes, 
this section will combine the results from all previous analyses. In general, this analysis 
will do two things. First, by looking at all of the Resolutions together, the sample size 
will be large enough to interpret the results from all of the Pacific states. 12 And secondly, 
it will give an overview of whether or not there are political alliances forming between 
the Pacific states and Western powers across particular issues. The previous sections 
were diverse enough to show whether alliances were forming on particular issues. But, 
this section will balance out the entire chapter by determining whether overall alliances 
are forming. By conducting the study in this way, it should be possible to eliminate the 
possibility for over generalizing simple trends that have occurred in the individual 
analyses. 
First of all, it will be most useful to compare correlation outputs for all of the 
Pacific states, as they compare to the Western powers. The interpretation will be much 
the same as the previous sections, insomuch that only statistically significant correlations 
will be considered, and the threshold for alliance formation will be set at a Pearson's 
correlation of approximately . 70 or above. However, much the same as previous 
sections, if there is a correlation close to the . 70 level, the situation will be marginally 
considered for relevance. 
12 Out of the ninety-six Resolutions recorded, Kiribati only voted six times (UN, 2003d), reducing the 
statistical significance below the standards of this paper. 
32 
Ethridge 
To begin, running a simple correlation output for all ninety-six Resolutions is 
suggesting that the previous sections were somewhat correct insomuch that political 
alliances were not forming with great frequency between the Pacific states and the 
Western powers. In fact, as table 4 demonstrates, by comparing votes from Pacific states 
and Western powers, there is only one statistically significant relationship that has a 
Pearson's correlation above .50. The interesting fact, though, is that this relationship 
occurred between Palau, and the US. The previous sections tended to discount alliances 
forming between Pacific states and the US, but it seems that when comparing voting 
behavior with data spanning across multiple issues, Palau is most in line with the US. 
Tonga, on the other hand, has formed statistically significant relationships with 
France, the UK and Australia. Albeit, the problem is that the Pearson correlations are not 
strong enough to suggest a solid relationship. The Pearson correlations between Tonga 
and France, Tonga and the UK, and Tonga and Australia were .360, .347 and .443, 
respectively. Similarly, Tuvalu's correlations tend to suggest that if any sort of voting 
pattern were to emerge, it would be in the form of a negative voting alliance with three of 
the four Western powers. Concerning Nauru, its voting behavior can be characterized by 
small sample sizes, but is nonetheless tending to suggest a similar result as Tuvalu, 
insomuch that no strong relationships seem even remotely possible in the near future. 
Table 5 illustrates all of these findings in a comprehensive manner. 
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Final Analvsis: C I .. fl II 96 Resolut" 
I KIRIBATI NAURU PALAU TONGA TUVALU USA FRANCE UK AUSTRALIA 
KIRIBATI Pearson 
.(a) .(a) .(a) .(a) .(a) .(a) .(a) .(a) .(a) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 6 6 2 5 2 6 6 6 6 
NAURU Pearson 
.(a) I .06 Correlation .37*) .04 -.10 .20 .09 .06 
Sig. (2-tailed) .78 .02 .83 .42 .11 .50 .62 
N 6 65 28 48 27 65 65 65 65 
PALAU Pearson 
.(a) .06 I Correlation .09 .00 .73(**) .27 .07 .37(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.78 .74 1.00 .00 .15 .70 .04 
N 2 28 30 18 15 30 30 30 30 
TONGA Pearson 
.(a) .34(*) .09 I .16 -.01 .36(**) .35(**) .44(**) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.02 .74 .52 .93 .00 .01 .00 
N 5 48 18 64 19 64 64 64 64 
TUVALU Pearson 
.(a) .04 .00 Correlation .16 1 .31 -.04 -.04 -.00 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.83 1.00 .52 .08 .82 .81 .98 
N 2 27 15 19 34 34 34 34 34 
USA Pearson 
.(a) -.10 . 73(**) Correlation -.01 .31 1 .27(**) .34(**) .09 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.42 .00 .93 .08 .01 .00 .37 
N 6 65 30 64 34 96 96 96 96 
FRANCE Pearson 
.(a) .20 .27 .36(**) -.04 .27(**) I .77(**) .48(**) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.11 .15 .00 .82 .01 .00 .00 
N 6 65 30 64 34 96 96 96 96 
UK Pearson 
.(a) .09 .07 .35(**) -.04 .34(**) .77(**) l .48(**) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.50 .70 .01 .81 .00 .00 .00 
N 6 65 30 64 34 96 96 96 96 
AUSTRALIA Pearson 
.(a) .06 .37(*) .44(**) .00 .09 .48(**) .48(**) I Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.62 .04 .00 .98 .37 .00 .00 
N 6 65 30 64 34 96 96 96 96 
Note: data developed from the United Nations, 2003d. 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). (a) Cannot be computed because at least one variable is constant. 
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In sum, other than the strong relationship that Palau shows with the US, specific 
investigation of the remaining Pacific states tends to agree with the findings from the 
previous sections. Voting behavior seems to be so varied between Pacific and Western 
powers that no real alliances with major powers seem to be emerging. Rather, according 
to Table 5, the major alliance that has emerged is one between France and the UK. 
Conclusion 
The result to emerge from this research is that UN voting behaviors tend to suggest small 
state alliances are not always forming between Pacific states and some of the world's 
most powerful countries. As the literature review suggested, the occurrence of alliances 
between small and large states is a phenomenon that is generally accepted by scholars. 
But, as this study suggests, alliance formation might not be the norm for all small states. 
Rather, it seems that the selected Pacific states might actually tend more toward intrastate 
11. 13 a iances. 
Though this analysis did encounter problems such as small sample sizes, and a 
lack of voting by Pacific states; by analyzing the largest samples in each section (i.e., US-
Cuban relations, nuclear weaponry), it was nonetheless possible to explore correlations 
between Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu in comparison with four large Western 
states. Moreover, if the suggestions in this chapter are correct, then it stands to reason 
that the general theories of small state alliance formation need to be further analyzed. 
Undoubtedly, the literature review demonstrated that popular alliance theories have been 
well tested with European examples. But by testing these theories with examples from 
the Pacific, it seems that they might not be universal. 
13 The relationship between Palau and US voting behaviors was not strong enough to consider at this point. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE ENVIRONMENT: 
SMALL-STATE FOREIGN POLICY 
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Ethridge 
One of the most important findings from the previous chapter suggests that alliances 
might not always be forming between some of the world's smallest and largest powers. It 
seems that United Nation voting behavior is a simple way to measure foreign policy 
behavior. However, in order to thoroughly understand small-state foreign policy, more 
must be understood about how the small states actually interact with large powers before 
and after a vote has been taken. Small state behaviors within international organizations, 
as well as the statements they have made, are an excellent opportunity for analyzing 
foreign policy behavior. Ultimately, by choosing one particular issue, the environment, 
this chapter looks at the foreign policy of small states through their involvement and 
political activity in international organizations. 
Working mostly in conjunction with the UN, there are other organizations in 
which the selected small states have recently become members. For example, the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) have recently 
gained the support of many of the world's smallest states. Indeed, as more opportunities 
are created for small states to interact with each other, it seems likely that previous 
theories of their foreign policy will require reevaluation. Moreover, the policy behaviors 
in such groups can be relatively easy to analyze, as there are concrete records concerning 
the statements and views of the various heads of state and chief foreign ministers. For 
the purpose of this chapter, the environment becomes a very salient issue as groups like 
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AOSIS were created specifically to deal with the threats of global warming, and other 
groups like the UN have had to face the challenges of policy initiatives such as the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
One potential problem with an analysis of this kind, however, is that there is not 
an excess of scholarly research devoted to understanding how small states interact with 
large states via international organizations, especially concerning the threats imposed by 
global environmental risks. For example, even though scholars such as Davis (1996), 
Houghton (1990), and Bodansky (1993) have examined groups like the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), their results rarely focus on the initiatives that small states take 
with regards to environmental policymaking, not the types of relationships they are 
forming. Thus, this chapter will address the deficiencies in the previous literature by 
examining the different policy roles that five small states have had on issues of the 
environment, mostly within two international organizations. Again, the focus of this 
chapter will be primarily on the positions that either align or separate small states from 
large states on issues of foreign policy. The difference from the previous chapter is that 
the environment will be the fundamental measurement. 
Choosing the environment as a point of analysis is important for this chapter 
because of the extremely fragile ecosystems of small island states. Though there are 
other issues that are important to small states (e.g., the economy, political vulnerability, 
human rights etc.), the environment has become an ever-present threat as sea levels 
continue to rise, and storms worsen with the heightened global temperatures. Ultimately, 
the environment affects everyone, but for those in small island states, the threat is 
eminently close. 
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Alliance of Small Island States 
The first international organization that this chapter analyzes is the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). AOSIS is a coalition of low'"lying coastal states that have 
banned together in order to better serve their environmental agendas. As an organization, 
AOSIS works most readily as an ad hoc negotiating voice and lobbying mechanism for 
small states to the UN. Members of the organization represent almost all regions of the 
world, ranging from Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean region, 
the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. Though not a requirement, most AOSIS 
members also belong to the UN. To illustrate, thirty-seven of AOSIS's forty-three 
members, or eighty-six percent, belong to the UN (Alliance of Small Island States 2003). 
In addition, AOSIS has even gained a voting block of twenty percent in the UN's General 
Assembly.14 
The history of AOSIS dates to 1991, where it was created after the Second World 
Climate Conference in Geneva, which was held in late 1990. Officially meeting for the 
first time in 1991, AOSIS has since worked toward voicing its concerns over the 
environment, with a special emphasis on the global climate change. Making appearances 
at World Environmental Summits such as the one held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, as well 
as being active in the UN's General Assembly, AOSIS has become a way for some of the 
world's smallest states to have a voice on issues of the environment. 15 
Some of AOSIS's basic tenets include the ideas that preventive action is the best 
action, precautionary actions need to be taken in most environmental cases, the polluter 
14 For more informatio11c on AOSIS membership, see Small Island Developing States at 
ht1p://sidsnet.org/aosis/index.html or htip://sidsnet.org/aosis/members.html. 
15 For more information on the appearances that AOSIS member states have made, see 
ht1p://www.sidsnet.org. 
38 
Ethridge 
often needs to be held more responsible, all states (small and large) should better 
cooperate with one another in terms of policy, and the idea that there is equity between 
states (AOSIS 2003). Given the tenets of AOSIS, some scholars of small-state foreign 
policy have even gone as far as saying, 
" ... small states will find it difficult to advance a special 
case on the grounds of size alone. They will need to find 
other avenues, the most promising of which are the 
promotion of principles translated into international rules 
and practice ... " (Sutton 1999: 403). 
Indeed, these beliefs seem to incorporate "international rule and practice". The 
remainder of this section, as well as the following section concerning the Kyoto Protocol, 
will further illustrate this point. 
To advance the analysis of AOSIS's positions, as well as the foreign policy 
behavior of the five Pacific states in this study, this chapter will review the type of policy 
that the organization represents. As the literature review suggested, one of the most 
widely accepted behaviors for small state foreign policy is the formation of alliances with 
larger states. But, the very existence of AOSIS, as well as the negotiating voice it 
represents, suggests that there is a coalition of small states actively combating the 
environmental practices of large states. 
To begin, for the purposes of this chapter it is necessary to understand the effect 
that the environment has on small island states. Indeed, the importance of the 
environment for the selected states makes their foreign policy on this issue extremely 
poignant. For example, some of the most recent figures suggest that there are more than 
eighteen million people that have been directly affected by weather-related disasters in 
the region of Oceania alone (Asia Pulse 2004). This example illustrates loss of home, 
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water supplies, and food source. Though the environment affects everyone, the results of 
global warming are extremely apparent for many of the low-lying islands that are 
constantly losing ground. Among many of the struggles that AOSIS faces, rising sea 
levels is one of the most talked about issues. States such as Tuvalu and Kiribati proclaim 
that their entire existence is dependent on more responsible foreign policy by some of the 
world's larger states. Moreover, all island states (even those that are not low-lying atolls) 
are being faced with the loss of infrastructure, as many of their most populated 
settlements are in close proximity to the coast (Asia Pulse 2004). As the following 
analysis of AOSIS policy behavior progresses, some of the more in-depth details of 
environmental effects will become clear. 
The type of policy that AOSIS is concerned with becomes apparent when the first 
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention met in 1995. It was at this 
conference that A OS IS submitted a draft protocol (later known as the Berlin Mandate) 
that would cut carbon dioxide emissions and other greenhouse gases by 20% before the 
year 2005. The reason that the Berlin Mandate is worth noting is because of the 
fundamental dilemma for international relations that small states most generally seek 
alliances with large powers (Liska 1968; Osgood 1968; Rothstein 1968). 
According to executive statements (AFL-CIO 1997), the Berlin Mandate 
specifically excluded developing nations from its standards for emission cutbacks. In 
essence, the Berlin Mandate stated that those states still working on their development 
(e.g., developing states) were not to be held accountable for any of the emissions that 
they might produce. Rather, the focus for emissions cutbacks was targeted solely at the 
world's most developed countries. Though the mandate has since been described as 
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"vague" and "umealistic'', the demands that AOSIS originally set forth were certainly 
dichotomous insomuch that they separated the responsibilities of small and large states 
when it came to emission cutbacks (AFL-CIO 1997; Scientists for Global Responsibility 
2004). 
Due mostly to the fact that many of the world's larger states produce higher 
percentages of greenhouse gases (e.g., C02), the requests made by AOSIS seem to be 
based on the idea that small states do not do as much damage to the environment as large 
states. 16 Indeed, it appears to be realistic for AOSIS to ask large states, which produce 
the majority of the world's emissions, to be more responsible with the environment. 
However, the fact that there was nothing written into the Berlin Mandate to oversee the 
emission outputs for developing states shows an extremely dichotomized policy. In order 
for AOSIS states to behave in a manner that would be considered equal with larger states 
(i.e., alliance forming), policy initiatives such as the Berlin Mandate would necessarily 
include regulations for small states as well. The fact that there was such a large 
difference in responsibilities between small and large states suggests that alliances were 
not forming between AOSIS and large states when the Berlin Mandate is considered. 
Casting aside the threat of larger states simply relocating their pollutant causing 
industry to smaller states, which was not covered under the initiative, AOSIS did not 
account for some of the adverse ramifications of the Berlin Mandate. If small states were 
not held to a similar standard, the potential for large state exploitation would be very real. 
Nonetheless, the lesson learned from the Berlin Mandate was that AOSIS did not feel 
small and large states should be held to the same standards when greenhouse gases are 
16 According to the United Nations, as of 1990 Annex I countries accounted for 55% of the world's carbon 
dioxide emissions (United Nations 2000) 
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considered. Rather, the policy initiative of AOSIS was one that put small and large states 
on completely different spheres of accountability. 
As this chapter progresses, it will become apparent that AOSIS has not abandoned 
its bid to improve the effects of global climate change. Though the Berlin Mandate was 
not wholly accepted, it did lay the groundwork for further policy reforms. Such 
organization on the part of small states tends to suggest that a shift in small state foreign 
policy might be occurring. Previously, states such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru would 
not have had the capacity or resources to influence the policy of larger states. However, 
as opportunities to enter organizations such as the UN have been created, other openings 
for ad hoc alliances such as AOSIS have become quite noticeable. 
The Kyoto Protocol 
The Berlin Mandate had weaknesses that separated small and large states in terms of their 
environmental responsibilities. Consequently, the result was that it met with severe 
strife. The failed attempt of AOSIS to form solid policy initiatives in the interest of small 
states, especially ones that were powerful enough to direct the policy of larger states, 
eventually led to more defined policymaking (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 2004). To be sure, the Kyoto Protocol was a major result from AOSIS's 
toil in creating the Berlin Mandate (AOSIS 2003). 
Concerning the Kyoto Protocol, dissimilar to the previous discussion, this section 
does not involve any particular organization per se. Instead, by simply examining the 
events both before and after the protocol, the attitudes of the selected small states should 
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become apparent. In essence, policy behavior for each of the five Pacific states (e.g., 
Kiribati, Mauritius, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu) will be considered in this section. 
In order to examine this type of case study data it is first necessary to understand 
some of the background behind the Kyoto Protocol. First, the protocol, which expanded 
and better defined the policies of the Berlin Mandate, was open for signature between 
March of 1998 and March of 1999. In sum, eighty-four states signed the protocol during 
this period (UNFCCC 2004). The purpose of the protocol was to create a legally binding 
agreement whereby Annex I countries would necessarily reduce overall greenhouse 
emissions by at least five percent of their respective levels per 1990.17 The time period 
for the reductions under the protocol was set to occur between 2008-2012 (AOSIS 
2004). 18 Some countries, however, were expected to go beyond the five percent levels, 
and cut emissions even more. For example, the combined target for the European 
Union's fifteen members was set at an eight percent drop, while the US had a targeted 
seven percent drop, and countries like Canada, Japan, and Poland were expected to drop 
their emissions by six percent (UNFCCC 2004). While not all Annex I countries have 
complied perfectly with the agreement, the two Annex I countries that have been 
criticized the most for non-compliance are the US and Australia (Burton 2002). Such 
actions by large states have created interesting foreign policy behavior by some of the 
small states in this study. 
17 According to the UNFCCC (2004), there are forty Annex I countries considered under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Annex I countries are selected to be so because of their status as industrialized nations or nations 
in transition to a market economy (UNFCCC 2004). Also, Annex I countries are defined by the fact that 
they have taken on certain targets under Kyoto. For more information on Annex I countries that have 
signed and/or ratified the Kyoto Protocol, see http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf. 
18 To view the Kyoto Protocol, see the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/ docs/ convkp/kpeng.htrnl. 
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Groups like AOSIS and the Pacific Island Forum (PIP) have let their positions 
toward the protocol become quite clear. Making numerous statements as to the 
importance of every country (especially Annex I countries) attempting to slow the 
process of global warming, there exists a sense of urgency by some the world's smallest 
states in protecting the environment. As the subsequent discussion illustrates, heads of 
governments have come together to fight for small states in the battle against changing 
climates. Examples of such cooperation is illustrated in events like the Pacific Island 
Climate Change Conference, where in April of 2000 Samoa's permanent representative 
to the UN declared a need for small states to take the lead in fighting global warming. 19 
He stated that waiting for large states to do so could be dangerous. Also, in December 
2002 the Secretary General of the Pacific Island Forum, Mr. Iosefa Maiava made a 
statement on behalf of his organization to support this urgency by congratulating New 
Zealand on ratifying the protocol, and condemning the US on its efforts, saying that more 
serious actions must be taken quickly.20 As more examples will be given, these two 
illustrate some of the urgency felt by small states. In essence, the Kyoto Protocol has 
become a hot topic, creating a wedge between some of the small and large states in this 
study. Other examples that will illustrate this idea include severe political threats and 
strong statements by high-ranking public officials. 
After some of the basic tenets behind the Kyoto Protocol are understood, it then 
becomes possible to analyze the political behaviors of the small states. Indeed, the fact 
that the protocol demands such high standards for large states creates the opportunity for 
foreign policy disagreements. For example, one of the most stark political actions taken 
19 The full speech can be found at http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/statements/08.html. 
20 The entire document can be found at http://www.forurnsec.org.fi/. The press specific press statement is 
123-02. 
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by any of the states in this study were the recent threats made by Tuvalu toward Australia 
for its non-compliance with protocol mandates. In 2002, Tuvalu threatened to take 
Australia to International Court because of its greenhouse gases, which did not comply 
with the acceptable levels set forth under the Kyoto Protocol (Burton 2002). As a result 
of the protocol, Australia had a target of an eight percent increase in its emissions 
(UNFCCC 2004). However, since 1998 Australia has increased its emissions by eleven 
percent (UNFCCC 2004). But, John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, has noted that 
the eleven percent increase is a result of positive changes his country has made in an 
effort to improve emissions (Tait 2002). Indeed, Howard stated that a twenty-two 
percent increase was projected for his country before the occurrence of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Tait 2002). And, even though Australia has not ratified the protocol, 
improvements have still been made. Though Tuvalu and Australia are both members of 
the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), this example shows that their policy directions still 
diverge quite sharply when issues of the environment are considered. Such divergence 
tends to suggest that certain areas of the foreign policy between Tuvalu and Australia are 
not in sync. Indeed, while Tuvalu is witnessing the lose of land due to rising ocean levels, 
Australia seems to be more concerned with the negative effects that the protocol could 
have on its economy (Burton 2002). 
When considering statements and threats made by Samoa, the secretary general of 
PIF, and Tuvalu the case begins to form that small states do, in fact, take decisive stances 
when issues of the environment are brought to the policy level. Each of the states in this 
study has its own policy behavior with regards to the Kyoto Protocol, and thus, the 
following will be most useful in determining the types of political relationships that they 
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are forming with large states. An individual discussion of the comments made by each 
state (in various international arenas) will be most useful. 
With an extremely low altitude and small surface area, Tuvalu is an acute 
example of a small state that has everything to lose if larger states are unwilling to 
cooperate with global policy initiatives toward the environment.21 However, the actions 
taken by Tuvalu toward Australia are not necessarily unique. Indeed, other small states 
have begun taking similar stances against large states in terms of environmental policy. 
To be sure, when considering these types of struggles over environmental policy, 
alliances between small and large states are certainly not the norm. 
In addition to Tuvalu's judicial threats toward Australia, Kiribati and Nauru have 
also become somewhat outspoken against the environmental policy of large states. For 
example, among other statements that have been made, Nauru's permanent representative 
to the UN, Vinci N. Clodumar, made some stark comments while speaking to the 
Commission of Sustainable Development in 2001. Clodumar stated that simple 
cooperation between states (both small and large) could quite possibly lead to more 
sustainable and environmentally friendly energy sources such as solar, wind and 
geothermal methods. However, Clodumar added that the international community would 
first have to break free from the "stranglehold" of the elite few and oil cartels of the 
world's industrialized nations. Clodumar went on to further admonish industrialized 
nations by specifically addressing the Kyoto Protocol. He said that specifically the Bush 
administration's current rejection of the protocol has been a "staggering disappointment 
considering that is perhaps the only multilateral mechanism today that is actively 
21 Tuvalu's highest peak is recorded at five meters in height, whereas there are only twenty-four actual 
kilometers of coastline (CIA 2003). 
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addressing the catastrophic changes in climate change brought on by the burning of fossil 
fuels" (United Nations 2001). 
Such statements must necessarily be seen as non-alliance forming, or as a wedge 
between small and large states. A true alliance consisting of large and small states would 
not likely contain a member speaking so strongly against those states that maintain 
different positions. This evidence suggests that small states such as Nauru no longer see 
it necessary to form alliances with large states in order to accomplish an environmental 
agenda. Contrarily, it seems that statements such as those made by Clodumar might 
suggest a new trend for the foreign policy of small island states. 
Similar to Tuvalu and Nauru, strong statements have been made by Kiribati, 
specifically addressing the impact that large states have on rising sea levels. For 
example, at the fifty-eighth session of the UN General Assembly, the Honourable Natan 
Tewee, foreign minister of Kiribati, proclaimed his country's desire for the major 
emitters of greenhouse gases to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Specifically, Tewee 
asked that those Annex I countries yet to ratify the protocol to do so in a "timely 
manner."22 As was already stated, the only two Annex I countries that have not ratified 
the protocol are Australia and the United States. Thus, it seems that this type of 
statement speaks specifically to these countries. Though statements of this type do not 
single handedly validate the idea that the Pacific states in this thesis are forming alliances 
between themselves, when added to the data from other examples there is some evidence 
to this effect. Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru seem to be behind one another in terms of 
wanting powerful states to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, they are not afraid to 
22 For further reference on the statement made by the Honourable Natan Tewee, see 
http:/ /www.un.org/webcastJga/58/statements/kirieng03 l 001.htm. 
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let their positions be known. In tum, it is quite difficult to say that such small states are 
forming strong alliances with the world's most powerful states. 
However, not as convincing as other small states in their quest to improve 
environmental conditions are Tonga and Palau which have been somewhat less forthright 
in their condemnation of large state environmental policy. Indeed, Tonga and Palau both 
belong to the AOSIS, and also have high stakes in the current global warming trends, but 
some of their wider policy decisions have fit more appropriately with the assumptions 
found in the literature review. Tonga and Palau are the only two states of the six being 
considered that participated in the "coalition of the willing," to fight terrorism alongside 
the United States (Nationwide News 2003). And, while these diplomatic choices do not 
suggest that Tonga and Palau are less invested in environmental policy than other AOSIS 
members, it does illustrate that they are more cooperative with large states in terms of 
global security. Furthermore, when such policy behaviors are analyzed more carefully, it 
would seem that the behaviors of Tonga and Palau have significant ramifications. 
As chapter one suggested, one of the most significant reasons that small states 
seek alliances with larger states is because of the protection that can be gained. Yet, it 
also noted that another possible reason is so that the small states might be able to free up 
their strained resources in order to focus on issues of national importance. It is worth 
noting that neither Palau nor Tonga offered direct military support to the coalition troops 
during the war in Iraq. Indeed, Palau does not have an active military, and Tonga has a 
very minimal defense service of four hundred personnel, which mainly works to maintain 
public order within its borders (Nationmaster 2004). Rather, while Tonga has recently 
offered forty-four troops to participate in Iraqi peacekeeping, both states have offered 
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their assistance in other ways than fighting the war (BBC 2004b). For example, Palau 
became more dedicated to fighting the foreign money laundering that has recently 
plagued it banks (Financial Times Information 2003). While Palau saw the money 
laundering as possibly helping terrorists, efforts have been made by its government to 
crack-down on criminal activity. It seems that while Tonga and Palau are not making as 
many statements about the environment as other Pacific states, their focus has simply 
shifted to another form of global security. Nonetheless, while the other states in this 
study have recently focused much attention to the universal ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Tonga and Palau have embraced countries like Australia and the United States 
by joining the "coalition of the willing." 
In sum, though Tonga and Palau have made clear that protecting the environment 
is a top priority by their mere involvement in groups like AOSIS and the Pacific Island 
Forum, it seems that as of late the two states have made almost no individual statements 
concerning their interests in the Kyoto Protocol. 23 Rather, the majority of the 
environmentally oriented statements that these countries have recently made have been in 
the form of group statements by organizations they belong to.24 And, when they do 
address the environment it is usually in the margins of a lengthy statement centered on 
the threats of world terrorism.25 Ultimately, it seems that this type of policy behavior, 
especially when considering the Kyoto Protocol, should be considered as having the 
23 See the list of references and statements made by PIF at hffi?://vvww.fommsec.org.fi/Home.htm and 
AOSIS at http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/background.html. 
24 Many group statements exist. For example, see the Climate Ark at 
http://www.climateark.org/articles/2001/2nd/cn062401.htm or executive summaries by the UN at 
hffi?:/ /www.unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/ A OSIS statement.htm. 
25 See, for example, the statements made by the Vice-President of Palau at the 57th General Assembly at 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020920palauE.htm. Also, to illustrate the shift in policy 
behavior since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, it is useful to compare with earlier statements at 
http://www. un. org/millennium/we beast/ statements/palau.htm. 
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potential to eventually form political alliance with large states within the realm of 
international organizations. It is difficult to discount Tonga and Palau's involvement in 
groups like AOSIS, but at the same time it would be flawed not to seriously consider 
their new policies toward terrorism. Also, the fact that Palau currently receives high 
levels of monetary aid from the US (CIA 2003) should not be discounted in any future 
analysis. Tonga's military support for peacekeeping operations might also play a 
significant role in its countries decision to form strategic alliances. 
As the Kyoto Protocol is just one aspect of environmental foreign policy, the 
previous discussion showed that some small states in this study have taken stances that 
directly oppose large states. As states like Tonga and Palau have been somewhat less 
active in making indvidual statements, the fact that organizations like PIF and AOSIS 
fight for the goals of small islands shows that there is still some unity among the states in 
this study. Further examination of the Pacific Island Forum will expand this idea. 
Pacific Island Forum 
As the final topic of this chapter, and in transition from the previous sections concerning 
AOSIS and the Kyoto Protocol, an analysis of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) provides 
another representation of how small states react to issues of the environment when there 
is not the overarching presence of an organization as influential as the UN. 
To begin, unlike AOSIS the Pacific Island Forum is not comprised solely of small 
states. To be sure, membership in PIF includes both Australia and New Zealand. 
Though the remainder of states in the forum are small, the presence of Australia and New 
Zealand add a unique aspect to this analysis. Also, the overall membership of PIF 
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includes all five Pacific states that this chapter is examining (e.g., Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, 
Tonga and Tuvalu). However, as PIF is a forum for Pacific states, small states in other 
parts of the world are not represented in its membership.26 
The PIF's central aim is to promote regional cooperation between its members by 
means of trade, investment, economic development, and international affairs. The forum 
is comprised of dignitaries who report on the views of their host country via many 
different arenas. Due to the fact that there are no permanent representatives to PIF, 
statements made on its behalf can come from presidents, foreign ministers, or experts in a 
particular field. Furthermore, the diverse set of issues that the forum deals with does not 
allow for its sole attention to be given to the environment (unlike AOSIS). Thus, this 
analysis differs from the previous insomuch that PIF treats environmental foreign policy 
as only one of many important topics. 
The funding for PIF occurs through contributions by member governments and 
outside donors. The donors include: Canada, China, the European Union, France, French 
Polynesia, Germany, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United Nations Development Programme (PIFS 2004). For the 
purpose of this analysis, these donations are important, as alliances can often form as a 
result funding (Rothstein 1968). 
As was already stated, the forum does many things to promote the well being of 
Pacific islanders. However, in order to keep with the focus of this chapter, PIF will only 
be analyzed for its political behavior concerning the environment. Quite similar to the 
previous section, statements made by national representatives will be the primary method 
26 The full list of Pacific Island Forum members includes: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu (Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 2004). 
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in determining the foreign policy views and behaviors of the member states. Once this 
data is presented, it will be possible to collectively analyze the three sections in this 
chapter, while at the same time drawing some conclusions as to how the five Pacific 
states in this study might be cooperating with the world's largest powers in terms of 
environmental foreign policy. 
There are twenty-nine PIF statements that were chosen for inclusion in this 
section. These statements range from 1998 to 2004, and should thus represent an 
adequate period of time, wherein a broad range of events have been able to influence 
decisions of foreign policy. Events such as the Kyoto Protocol and the attacks of 
September 11 are well represented in this period of time, and will have had the possibility 
to affect the content of such statements. In all, every statement made by PIF was 
considered for inclusion. However, only those pertaining directly to the environment 
were considered. In sum, all statements made by PIF in the last six years, which 
specifically concerned the environmental threats of climatic change and small island 
. b"l" . 1 d d 2728 sustama 11ty were me u e . 
As twenty-nine statements create a large amount of data, this section will codify 
the statements in a way that does not necessarily discuss each report individually. Rather, 
those statements which have similar messages and were made during a relatively similar 
time period (i.e., the same month and/or year) will be combined into overarching 
analyses. By grouping the statements together in this manner, it should nonetheless be 
possible to grasp the overall foreign policy views of PIF members. The following will 
27 All statements can be reviewed at http://www.forumsec.org.fi/news/news.htm. 
28 Twenty-nine statements represent approximately three percent of all statements and press releases made 
by PIF over the six-year period at hand. However, they represent all statements made that directly 
concerned global emissions. 
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examine how the five Pacific states at hand have reacted to issues of environmental 
foreign policy over the last six years. 
There were ten statements made by PIF in November 1998 directly concerning 
environmental policy decisions. While no other month addressed the environment as 
much, this month was the most influential when compared to any of the others during the 
six years being examined. Furthermore, four of the ten statements that were made in 
November 1998 were done so by countries in this study (one each from Kiribati and 
Nauru, and two from Tuvalu), while three more were from small Pacific islands not in 
this study (Niue, Samoa, and the Cook Islands), and three others were joint statements 
made by PIF as a whole. 
In November 1998, the four statements made by Kiribati, Nauru, and two by 
Tuvalu all called for strikingly similar measures to be taken in terms of policy initiatives. 
As the Fourth Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires, Argentina was closely 
approaching, each of the three states asked for industrialized nations to begin "rapidly'' 
reducing all levels of greenhouse emissions that they were producing.29 Not dissimilar to 
the urgency felt by small states in the discussion of the Kyoto Protocol, very prominent 
officials in their respective countries made all three of these statements. They included: 
the Permanent Secretary for Environment and Social Development in Kiribati, the 
Deputy Speaker of Parliament for Nauru, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Hon Bikenibeu 
Paeniu of Tuvalu. The fact that these officials all felt it necessary to formally ask 
industrialized countries to reverse their greenhouse emissions shows that their foreign 
policy behaviors are not necessarily aligned with some of the world's large powers. 
Rather, the language used by these countries to differentiate between industrialized and 
29 For comparison of the four statements, see http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/news98.htm. 
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unindustrialized shows that Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu view a dichotomized relationship 
to exist when environmental foreign policy is considered. Furthermore, they view 
themselves to be a part of a common thread, as they all belong and make similar 
statements on behalf of PIF. 
Indeed, by this point in the chapter, these types of statements should not be 
surprising. However, what seems somewhat unexpected, as permanent members of PIF, 
is that Palau and Tonga made no similar statements. Though included as signors on the 
three joint statement made in November 1998, which sought to change the international 
attitude toward sustainability, Tonga and Palau do not singularly take serious stances 
against the greenhouse emissions that large states produce. This seems to be the case 
because they did not initiate any statements under PIF similar to those of Kiribati, Nauru, 
and Tuvalu. As the fear of losing funding for PIF could be one possible explanation for 
Palau and Tonga's inactive foreign policy behavior, there were many other PIF states in 
November 1998 that were not worried about demanding certain things of large states, 
regardless of the consequences. Ultimately, it is difficult to determine the reasoning 
behind the relatively inactive foreign policy of Palau and Tonga. The only real 
conclusion is simply that they do not seem as engaged in small state alliances (i.e., 
AOSIS and PIF) as Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. With the exception of one individual 
statement made by Palau, the inactivity of these two states will become more apparent as 
this analysis progresses. 
The other three PIF states that made statements in November 1998 were the Cook 
Islands, Niue, and Samoa. Though beyond the general scope of the five states that this 
study has examined, each of these states made markedly similar statements as to those 
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made by Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. In general the remainder of the statements made 
by PIF members in November 1998 all requested that large states lower their levels of 
greenhouse emissions. Indeed, the first line in each of these statements appealed for a 
serious reduction by some of the world's largest countries. In all, all ten statements in 
November 1998 demanded that something be done to improve global warming. It seems 
that the further PIF statements are examined, the more apparent their request for large 
countries to cut emissions becomes. 
The statements made by PIF members in November 1998 that were submitted as 
joint remarks (i.e., made by all members) called for the same reductions. However, more 
specifically they asked for the creation of a training course whereby Pacific states might 
learn how to better sustain their development. The next discussed the views of scientists 
such as Steve Schneider on the probable effects that climate change will have for small 
islands in the future. The third was a request for all countries to work together at the 
upcoming climate conference in Buenos Aires to create a solid plan for sustainability 
(PIFS 2004). In all, these statements showed that there was a need for Pacific islands to 
learn how to improve their own conditions of environmental sustainability, while also 
stating that large states are not doing enough in the fight. The fourth joint statement in 
November 1998 illustrated that the effects of climate change are real, and that it might 
already be too late to change what has been done. The point, nonetheless, was simply 
that it is never too late to act responsibly. Furthermore, each statement called on 
"developed" countries to do more in leading the fight. 30 Again forming a dichotomous 
relationship between PIF members and large states. 
3° For specific reference to the four joint statements, see htt.p://www.forumsec.org.fi/news/news98.htm. 
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The next statements that will be considered are the remaining two made in 1998 
and 1999. The only statement made in 1998 by PIF concerning the effects of the 
environment, which was not made in the month of November, came in October. Whereas 
the only one made in 1999 came in April. The statement made in October was made by 
the Secretary General at the time, Tony Slatyer, and noted the importance of international 
support for issues concerning the change in global temperatures. Furthermore, Mr. 
Slatyer asked for all Pacific countries to remember the usefulness of pursuing their 
desires for change in arenas such as the UN (PIFS 2004). This statement illustrates the 
importance that PIF puts on unity, as its Secretary General is asked for Pacific states to 
band together at many different levels. The other statement mentioned, which came in 
1999, was similar to the one by Mr. Slatyer insomuch that it too called for improved 
coordination by Pacific states at the multinational level. The April 1999 statement stated, 
"effective partnerships among all stakeholders, and in particular local communities, 
NGOs and the private sector, will be essential for sustainable development" (PIFS 2004). 
In this case, the stakeholders are the Pacific states and the partnerships refer to an 
increase in organizations like AOSIS and PIF. In other words, this statement referred to 
the need of forming strong environmental alliances between Pacific states, while not 
forgetting the potential of NGOs or the private sector. Partnerships seem to be the key 
point in the April 1999 statement. 
The year 2000 only saw one statement by PIF regarding the issue of 
environmental foreign policy. However, this statement was certainly important, 
especially with regards to Pacific foreign policy. In April 2000, Japan and all PIF states 
made a statement announcing a partnership that would address the vision for the Pacific. 
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Among the identified threats noted in their partnership, the most significant were the 
changes in global temperatures. As a statement of this kind was not drafted with PIF and 
any other world power during the six years at hand, the fact that Japan formed a 
partnership with PIF suggests that alliances between small and large states are possible, 
but not widespread. 
In the year 2001 three statements were made. Two of these statements came in 
August and the other was in April. The two statements in August were both made by 
Nauru, as they were currently hosting a PIF summit. These two statements were both 
made by the President of Nauru, HE Teburoro Tito. While addressing PIF, President Tito 
made specific note of the accomplishments that PIF had made over its existence of three 
decades. These accomplishments included the implementation of a fisheries agency, 
better coordination between PIF members, the creation of the Summit for Smaller Island 
States, building better relations with groups like the UN, and, most importantly for this 
study, building stronger international relations with their "immediate Asian neighbors" 
(PIFS 2004). President Tito's noting of PIF's building stronger relations with 
"immediate Asian neighbors" as one of the major highlights that PIF has done over the 
last three decades tends to suggest that the organization puts high emphasis on the 
forming of alliances with its neighbors. The previously cited agreement between PIF and 
Japan can easily be seen as one such alliance. Furthermore, President Tito's statement 
makes no mention of working closely with Western countries in North America or 
Europe. To this order, the only reference made concerning these types of relations is in 
his praise of PIF states that have found increased involvement in the UN. However, 
PIF's improved work at the UN should not necessarily be seen as aligning with large 
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states. Rather, as chapter two suggested, the fact that states such as Kiribati, Nauru, 
Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu were all recently admitted into the UN seems to be the type of 
improvement that President Tito spoke of in his statements. 
The other statement made in 2001 came in April. This statement was made by the 
Minister of Works and Energy of Kiribati, at the Ninth Session Commission on 
Sustainable Development. And, similar to many other statements made by Kiribati, this 
one stressed the opinion that large states simply had not done their part in protecting the 
environment (PIFS 2004). As these statements continue to build on one another, the case 
continues to strengthen that the small states in this study have not taken sides with large 
states in the fight to protect the environment. What seems to emerge is a sort of alliance 
between small states that demands certain actions by large states. 
There were eleven statements made by PIF concerning the environment in 2002. 
However, as this section has already laid substantial groundwork for the type of foreign 
policy behavior that the small states in this study have previously demonstrated, only a 
general summary will be discussed in this portion.31 For the purpose of this study, 
September 2002 was the second biggest month for PIF statements concerning the 
environment (behind November 1998). There were seven statements made in September, 
two in August, one in March, and one in December. As September 2002 was when the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development occurred in Johannesburg, many world 
leaders made statements on the behalf of their countries. Such PIF countries included 
Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Palau, and Tonga. In general, the statements followed the trend 
found in earlier statements, whereby the small states valued the cooperation of Pacific 
31 For a complete record of the statements made by PIF in 2002, see 
htt_p :/ iv..'WW. forumsec.org. fj/news/news2 002 .htm. 
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organizations in fighting issues like climatic change, but felt that many large countries 
had not been doing their part (PIPS 2004). However, as Palau has only been briefly 
noted in this analysis, the statement made by its president is worth noting. 
At the World Summit in Johannesburg, the president of Palau made a statement 
which was somewhat uncharacteristic for his country's foreign policy. However, the 
comments in this case were powerful. In Johannesburg, the president of Kiribati said, 
"It is well past time for the developed nations to recognize 
that their industrial activities have had, and will continue to 
have, a great and real impact on others. In the very simplest 
terms, take responsibility for your actions ... our destinies 
may very well be the window to your future and the future 
of our planet. Listen to us, hear our alarm. We are under 
attack - not by our enemies, but by our friends" (PIFS 
2004). 
As Palau does not often make statements such as this one, this speech begins to 
justify its membership in organizations like PIF and AOSIS. Indeed, the President of 
Palau sees the fight against the environment to have a serious lack of involvement by 
industrialized countries. Though their position is not often expounded, Palau's 
cooperation in joint statements, such as the ones that were previously explained, begins to 
make sense when their political views are understood in this light. It is important to 
remember that this type of statement was completely aligned with the other ten 
statements made by PIF members in 2002. 
The PIF made no statements concerning the environment in 2003, but has since 
followed up by giving a thorough report of SIDS (Small Island Developing States) for 
2004. This statement came in January by the Honourable Bikenibeu Paeniu, the Minister 
of Finance, Economic Planning and Industries from Tuvalu. As far as the previous 
analysis is concerned, this statement did not make any definitive demands of 
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industrialized states. Rather, this statement was merely an update of what small states 
view will likely confront them in the years to come. The statement basically noted that 
Pacific states must find better ways to entice large states in the struggle to fight global 
emissions (PIFS 2004). It mentions the importance of action plans like the Barbados plan 
for cutting emissions, as well as the plans that were drafted in Johannesburg in 2002. 
But, more importantly, the final statement made in this analysis stresses the importance 
of"Mobilising resources to build capacity for sustainable development" (PIFS 2004). As 
the minister from Tuvalu states on behalf of PIF, it will be important for Pacific states to 
be able to mobilize resources on their own. Though a multinational approach is 
preferred, this statement urges Pacific states to create and strive for initiatives that will 
help in the struggle to attain sustainability by themselves (PIFS 2004). It is seen that 
large states are not doing enough, and that the time has come to act without their support. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, when the statements made by PIF member states are considered in 
conjunction with the data presented on AOSIS and the Kyoto Protocol, it becomes clear 
that the Pacific states being considered are highly organized and have also began to 
actively combat the views of the some of the world's strongest powers. One serious 
possibility for this type of behavior is from the added support that clusters of small states 
can create for each other. By uniting together in international organizations, small states 
stand a much better chance of creating a voice that can be heard at the level of foreign 
policy. In essence, the statements made by the Pacific islands represent a sense of 
urgency to create foreign policy that will benefit more than just short-term political 
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agendas. Undeniably, it seems that groups like AOSIS and PIP have come together in a 
fight to preserve the environment. Moreover, contrary to what the literature might 
suggest, these groups have formed alliances on their own will and accord, and are 
actively speaking against the practices oflarge states that are not doing what is asked of 
them. Though some small states seem to be more active than others in this fight, the 
mere fact that the membership in such groups is so strong suggests that the small states in 
this study might have very well begun forming alliances between themselves. As issues 
such as the Iraq war and the attacks of September 11 were only briefly noted in this 
chapter, it would seem that more research is necessary if the overall foreign policy of 
these states is to be fully understood. However, when it comes to the environment, this 
chapter suggests that many small states are not waiting for large states to create the 
policy. Nor are they simply signing on to policies that would place them in favorable 
positions with large states. Rather, this chapter suggested, through many different 
statements and testimonies, that the small states being considered have band together and 
become proactive in taking the steps they feel necessary to defend the environment. 
AOSIS, the Kyoto Protocol, and PIP are three solid examples of small state foreign 
policy toward the environment. 
The following chapter will further this examination of the environment while also 
analyzing two crucial aspects of foreign policy for yet another small state. As Mauritius 
has thus far been excluded from the analysis, chapter four will include some of the major 
policy decisions that the small island in the Indian Ocean has recently made. Being a 
small island with a larger population and more economic power, Mauritius will make a 
nice transition from the five Pacific states that have been examined in the previous 
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chapters. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Mauritius is not completely different 
from the Pacific examples. Indeed, Mauritius has shown similar trends on its recent 
foreign policy, especially on issues concerning the environment. 
62 
Introduction 
CHAPTER4 
MAURITIUS: THE FOREIGN POLICY 
OF A SMALL ISLAND STATE 
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
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This chapter examines the foreign policy of Mauritius. As was already explained, 
Mauritius' status as a small state is evident in its small physical size, economic 
capabilities and population. However, the main reason that Mauritius was selected for 
analysis in this chapter is because of its previous status as a member of the UN Security 
Council during the Iraq Crisis. Its position as a major decision-maker under the Security 
Council provides a unique opportunity to study small-state foreign policy. 
First, in order to better understand Mauritius's history, this chapter will give a 
brief description of its background. Following the historical account will be an 
explanation of Mauritius' current foreign policy. The three policy issues chosen for 
individual analyses in this section are Mauritius' position on the environment, the 
situation in Iraq, and the disputed island territory of Diego Garcia. By examining these 
issues, in that they arguably represent a diverse set of policy concerns, it should be 
possible to determine how Mauritius reacts with large states on various policy initiatives. 
History of Mauritius 
The European record of Mauritius dates to its "discovery" by Portuguese sailors in the 
sixteenth century. However, due to the lack of a colonial stake, the Portuguese never 
officially presided over its lands. And, though Arab and Malay sailors have some 
accounts of visiting the island as early as the tenth century (Brunner 2004), it was not 
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until the Dutch arrived in 1598 that Mauritius began its future as a colony. In 1638, 
Dutchman Cornelius Simonsz Gooyer claimed the first permanent Dutch settlement in 
Mauritius. Gooyer later became the first European governor in Mauritius, presiding over 
twenty-five Dutch colonizers. The island was eventually named for the Prince Maurice 
of Nassau, who abandoned the territory with all other European settlers in 1710 due to the 
many hardships arising from colonization (i.e., disease, drought, and famine) 
(Government of Mauritius 2004). 
By 1715 the French arrived on the nearly abandoned island and claimed it to be 
the property of King Louis XV. 32 Mauritius was shortly thereafter renamed Ile de 
France. In 1767, four years after France lost the Seven Years War, the French 
government officially took control of island. However, in 1814 the British government 
eventually won control of Mauritius under the Treaty of Paris, at which point they 
quickly returned the island's name to Mauritius. From this point, the British held solid 
control over the island for more than a century. Eventually, however, the creation of 
Mauritius' Labour Party, which has strong roots to a visit made by Mohandas Gandhi in 
1907, lead to Hindu Seewoosagur Ramgoolam becoming the country's first Chief 
Minister in 1965. Consequently, in 1968, under the leadership of the Labour Party, 
Mauritius successfully lobbied to become an independent country (Government of 
Mauritius 2004).33 
Currently, in 2004 the political status of Mauritius is that of a free and fair 
democracy, which holds democratic elections. In addition, there are three official 
32 The only people left on the island were slaves brought from Madagascar and other neighboring locations, 
who were brought to work for on Dutch fanns. 
33 For more information on the history of Mauritius, refer to the government of Mauritius at 
http://ncb.intnet.mu/govt/history.htm. 
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languages being English, French, and Creole. The official law of Mauritius is mostly 
French Napoleonic, with British Common Law still appearing in certain areas. The 
ethnic majority in Mauritius is Hindu, dating mostly to the slaves that were brought to the 
country from India. Moreover, Mauritius' has been very active in foreign policy since its 
independence, gaining admission into the UN in 1968 and participating in groups such as 
AOSIS (CIA 2003). 
As Mauritius' history has had many twists, it current status as a small state places 
it in a unique position. Indeed, its people have had to endure much over the last many 
centuries. From fighting slavery, to winning its independence, Mauritius has faced many 
of the same struggles as other colonies dating to the period of European expansion. The 
following, nonetheless, will analyze the type of strategies that Mauritius has taken in its 
effort to create effective foreign policy. 
The Environment 
Considering the previous discussion of Pacific policy toward the environment, it is 
sufficient at this point to briefly make note of some of Mauritius' policy toward the 
Kyoto Protocol and other initiatives. The goal is to determine whether or not Mauritius' 
foreign policy behavior has similar tendencies as the Pacific examples. In essence, larger 
conclusions about the formation of alliances will become apparent, as Mauritius has 
either sided with or against the Pacific examples. The next two sections will add to 
Mauritius' foreign policy behavior by including in-depth analyses of the situation in Iraq 
and the disputed territory of Diego Garcia. 
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As was already noted, Mauritius, being an island state in the Indian Ocean, is 
culturally quite different than the five Pacific islands examined in earlier chapters. 
However, its membership in alliances such AOSIS, as well as the threats it faces by rising 
sea levels certainly suggest that Mauritius' stake in environmental foreign policy is an 
equally salient topic. Ultimately, Mauritius has had very active foreign policy on the 
issue by: strongly supporting the Kyoto Protocol, being the current host country for the 
ten-year review of the Barbados Plan of Action, being the home to AOSIS's current 
chairman, and shaping policy decisions as a past member of the UN Security Council. 
The stance of Mauritius is especially unique for this study because, of the six states being 
analyzed in this thesis it has the longest history in the UN. 34 
To begin, it should be noted that as the future host of the 2005 International 
Meeting for the 10-year Review of the Barbados Progamme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States (BPOA + 10), Mauritius is certainly 
making a statement about its views toward the environment. The BPOA+lO conference 
is a means for evaluating the progress made on the development of small states since the 
Barbados Plan of 1994, which set forth specific measures at the national, regional and 
international level for the sustainability of small island states (SIDS). In essence, hosting 
an event of this size suggests serious commitment and would not likely be given to a 
country that had not shown dedication to previous policies concerning the sustainability 
of small states. In other words, since 1994 Mauritius has been seen as a leader in the 
environmental policy of small states. Being given the honor of hosting the BPOA+lO 
conference is some evidence to this assertion. 
34 Mauritius was admitted to the United Nations in 1968. 
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Another serious commitment to environmental policy made on the part of 
Mauritius can be seen through the appointment of AOSIS's current chairman. As 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Permanent Representative to UN, 
J agdish Koonjul has helped to put Mauritius at the front of the fight for small-state 
sustainability. As explained in the previous section, AOSIS has played key roles in 
creating the Berlin Mandate, as well as supporting the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, the 
chairman of this group carries with him/her a legacy of fighting for the protection of 
small states. As plenipotentiary, Mr. Koonjul not only represents AOSIS, but also his 
country as a whole. This necessarily indicates that Mauritius has taken a strong stance 
within an alliance of small states that is seeking to combat the environmental practices of 
large states.35 Efforts for the passage and implementation of either the Berlin Mandate or 
the Kyoto Protocol could also be included in this discussion. As a member and co-signor 
of all passages set-forth by AOSIS, Mauritius has shown that it is actively involved in 
creating policy that affects large states. 
As was already stated, the scope of this brief discussion on Mauritius is not to 
detem1ine whether or not it is fom1ing alliances with larger states, as the following 
sections will have more capacity for this query. Instead, the purpose of this discussion is 
to outline some of the important aspects of Mauritius' foreign policy behavior toward the 
environment. Thus, at this point it will be most beneficial to further analyze Mauritius' 
foreign policy in two distinct areas. 
35 The goals of AOSIS are only briefly noted in this section, as the previous chapter does much more to 
highlight the actions of its member states. 
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Mauritius has not been elusive with its views toward the situation in Iraq. Indeed, 
analyzing its views toward the war in Iraq is an excellent way to evaluate the type of 
behavior that the country has had on issues of foreign policy. For example, in March 
2003 at a special session of Private Notice Questions (PNQ), the minister of foreign 
affairs/deputy prime minister of Mauritius responded to questions from Dr. N. 
Ramgoolam of the opposition party. The questions asked to the deputy prime minister 
were whether or not the government of Mauritius thought the war in Iraq to be unjustified 
or illegal, and why the government had not forcefully condemned the war.36 In response 
to these questions, the deputy prime minister stated the official view of the Cabinet, 
which was approved March 21, 2003. He said, 
"Mauritius is of the opinion that the war in Iraq was 
avoidable at the point in time when it was started by the US 
and UK and that the UN disarmament inspectors should 
have been given more time to complete their work. 
Furthermore, Mauritius was and is of the view that the 
sanction of the United Nations Security Council was 
needed for any military action against Iraq" (Mauritius 
Labour Party 2004). 
A statement of this kind is difficult to confuse. Indeed, being delivered in March 
2003, shortly after the war in Iraq began, Mauritius' deputy prime minister basically 
stated that it was the opinion of his country that the US and the UK provoked an 
avoidable war. Though a coalition of countries (as explained in chapter three) was 
engaged in the Iraqi war, the government of Mauritius singled-out the US and the UK as 
the major wrongdoers. As far as Mauritius' foreign policy is concerned this type of 
action does not seem to promote positive relations with major world powers. 
36 For more information on the PNQs, see http://labour.mu/mlp/files/iraqmtiuspositionpng250303.htm. 
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Beyond the view of the Mauritian Cabinet, Mr. Koonjul, Mauritian 
plenipotentiary, had some less threatening words to say about the situation at a public 
meeting of the Security Council in 2003. In essence, he stated that Iraq had made 
progress with allowing weapons inspectors to search for weapons before the war began. 
And, because of this cooperation, more time should have been allowed before war was 
declared. Moreover, Mr. Koonjul noted that as early as March 2003 his country had 
established a rehabilitation fund for the Iraqi people. The fund was named "Fond de 
Solidarite avec le Peuple Irakien," and was designed to be channeled through the UN 
(Government of Mauritius 2004).37 
This type of statement by Mr. Koonjul simply goes to show that even though 
Mauritius has actively spoke-out against large states that circumvented UN weapons 
inspectors and entered into war with Iraq, its government was nonetheless willing to 
create funding opportunities for the UN to use in rehabilitating war-tom Iraqis. As it is 
unlikely that any country in the "coalition of the willing" would object to these type of 
funds being created, the fact that Mauritius used the UN as a means of distributing the 
money (and not coalition troops) shows a certain sense of opposition to the states that 
went to war without the sanctions of UN weapons inspectors. 
Lastly, a final example of the type of foreign policy that Mauritius has had with 
regards to the situation is Iraq is apparent through its implementation and statements 
made concerning UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Occurring on November 8, 
2002, Mauritius was still a member to the Security Council during this critical resolution. 
In essence, Resolution 1441 stated that the Security Council deplored Iraq's efforts to 
comply with UN mandates regarding its weapons of mass destruction and terrorist 
37 For the entire speech, see http://foreign.gov.mu/speech/iraq2603htm. 
69 
Ethridge 
activities, which threatened global peace and security.38 In addition, it demanded that 
Iraq give more cooperation to UN weapons inspectors. Like all other members of the 
Security Council, Mauritius adopted this resolution. As one final chance was given for 
Iraq's compliance, Mr. Gokool, acting Ambassador for Mauritius, stated that the 
unanimous vote certainly strengthened the council's unity, and that he also had complete 
faith in the weapon's inspectors ability to carryout their duties. 39 To be sure, as a 
member of the Security Council, Mauritius had faith in Resolution 1441 and also felt that 
Iraq should be given one final chance. 
However, as previously discussed, the statement made on behalf of the Mauritian 
Cabinet in March 2003 demonstrated that by the time war was declared Mauritius did not 
feel sufficient time had been given to the weapons inspectors. Rather, in 2002 as Gokool 
stated his country had complete faith in the Council's decisions, it seems that later 
statements suggest they were unhappy with the final decision to declare war. It seems the 
real alliance that Gokool and the Mauritian government were creating was one with the 
United Nations, not one with states such as the US, the UK, and Australia. 
Ultimately, it seems that there is little doubt that Mauritius viewed the Iraqi 
situation to be a serious threat during its term on the Security Council. It demonstrated 
this view by voting on Resolution 1441. However, as time passed, and war was finally 
declared, the only alliance that the country truly formed was one with the United Nations. 
It is difficult to consider Mauritius' foreign policy behavior during this time period to be 
inline with some of the world's largest powers. 
38 For the entire text of Resolution 1441, see 
http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement. 
39 For the complete statement, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm. 
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Diego Garcia 
Diego Garcia is an island in the Chagos Archipelago, more than one thousand miles east 
of Mauritius and one thousand miles south of India. In essence, Diego Garcia is situated 
in the heart of the Indian Ocean. As part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), 
the island has recently become a very salient issue of foreign policy for Mauritius. In 
1965, before Mauritius' independence, all inhabitants of Diego Garcia were forced to 
relocate to Mauritius, in order to make way for a US naval and air base. In all, there were 
approximately fifteen hundred people that were displaced (Government of Mauritius 
2004). 
The reason that the US selected Diego Garcia for its military base was a result of 
Cold War threats and the need to find a strategic location for its armed forces in the 
Indian Ocean. At that time, British forces controlled much of the Indian Ocean territory 
and were willing to assist the US in their search. As part of the deal between the 
Americans and British to set up a military base on the island, the US received a vacant 
atoll (e.g., Diego Garcia) and the British received a reduced price of fourteen million 
dollars (five million pounds) on a purchase of Polaris missiles for their submarines 
(CBSNews 2003). As the inhabitants of Diego Garcia were displaced to the African 
state, Mauritius has had little say in the transfer since 1965. 
Since the reassignment of the island, Diego Garcia has been used by the US 
military in various wartime operations (Brunner 2004). Ranging from uses during the 
Persian Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox, Diego Garcia was used as a base for B-52 
bombers that launched nearly 100 long-range cruise missiles at Iraq on December 1 7, 
1998 in Operation Desert Fox (Brunner 2004). At the current time Diego Garcia is even 
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being used to detain suspected terrorists that have been apprehended in the War on Terror 
(Financial Times Information 2004). Indeed, the US is still utilizing the benefits of 
having a military base in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The question for this chapter, 
however, pertains to the foreign policy of Mauritius on the subject. As Mauritius is the 
current home for the native inhabitants of Diego Garcia, its government has necessarily 
faced the realities of a strategic agreement between the US and the UK that occurred 
more than four decades ago. 
Mauritius' foreign policy on this subject can be measured in three ways. First, 
actions that the country has taken to return the original inhabitants of Diego Garcia to 
their island will be considered. Second, statements that state officials have made on the 
situation will be analyzed. Third, conclusions will be drawn as to the general policy 
behaviors of Mauritius. 
Mauritius has done much in the recent past to suggest that they disagree with the 
British and American treatment of Diego Garcia's original inhabitants. For example, on 
a recent visit to the US, the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Paul Berenger, told President 
George W. Bush that ifthere is a lack of "positive negotiations" with the British Prime 
Minster Tony Blair concerning the repatriation of Diego Garcia's former inhabitants, his 
country will be compelled to seek legal action (Panafrican News 2004). Though 
declarations like this do not necessarily result in action being taken, such deeds can often 
be good indicators for how a particular state is reacting on issues of foreign policy. 
Since the threats that Mauritius' prime minister made in the US, his country has 
followed up by taking somewhat more serious actions. In a fight to have Diego Garcia's 
72 
Ethridge 
former inhabitants repatriated,40 the Mauritius government has recently begun exploring 
its option to leave the British Commonwealth (Gardiner 2004). In its effort to prepare for 
legal action against Britain, this is an important step. The British High Court wrote into 
law that members of the Commonwealth could not sue Britain for any actions occurring 
before independence was granted (Gardiner 2004). Thus, it is imperative for Mauritius to 
change its legal status if it plans to sue Britain in International Court. Such discussion to 
leave the Commonwealth seems to imply that Mauritius' foreign policy behavior has not 
focused on the formation of alliances with large states, insomuch that it has threatened 
the US and explored avenues to disassociate with Britain. Both of these actions imply 
that Mauritius' foreign policy behavior is similar to the Pacific examples from in the 
previous chapters. 
As one statement and a brief explanation of the intent to withdraw from the 
British Commonwealth are not necessarily indicative of the fact that Mauritius is not 
interested in forming alliances with large states, more policy behavior must be examined. 
For example, the most recent statements made by Prime Minister Berenger concerning 
Diego Garcia indicate that while his country still wants the original inhabitants to be 
repatriated, Mauritius is not opposed to the US maintaining a military base on the island. 
The exact words of the prime minister were that, 
"During the Cold War there was strong resistance by 
countries in the region against the existence of an Anglo-
American base. However, among other states, Mauritius, 
India and Madagascar are no longer opposed to the US 
military base in Diego-Garcia" (British Broadcasting 
Company 2004). 
40 The current number of people living on Mauritius that can directly trace their roots to the 1,500 people 
that were removed from the island in 1967 stands at roughly 8,000 (Panafrican News 2004). 
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This type of statement shows that while Mauritius wants certain actions to be taken with 
regards to Diego Garcia (e.g., repatriation of original inhabitants), its foreign policy has 
not completely cut off positive relations with large states. In essence, Mauritius' 
negotiations over Diego Garcia are demanding that repatriation occurs, but also show a 
willingness to cooperate with the US by not fighting the existence of its military base. 
This type of concession signifies that while Mauritius has not been afraid of combating 
large states on issues of foreign policy, it has not completely severed positive relations 
with the US. 
Conclusion 
The activity of Mauritius on issues of environmental policy, the situation in Iraq, and the 
dispute over Diego Garcia all tend to suggest that its foreign policy has not focused solely 
on the formation of alliances with large states. Rather, becoming an activity participant 
in the fight to lower greenhouse emission, Mauritius has shown that it is willing to 
challenge any large state that does not comply with standards that it deems acceptable. 
Also, the stance that Mauritius has taken on the situation in Iraq has greatly opposed the 
military actions of Britain, the US, and all other states belonging to the coalition of the 
willing. By putting more emphasis on the UN, and condemning those states that entered 
Iraq before UN inspectors has declared emergency, Mauritius has acted in a way that 
defies states like Australia, Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the US, which all entered 
Iraq as part of the coalition. Furthermore, Mauritius' dispute concerning Diego Garcia 
has resulted in serious threats being made to both Britain and the US. Ultimately, this 
type of foreign policy has created relations for Mauritius that separate its government 
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from two of the world's largest powers. Again, these three areas of policy represent a 
wide range of issues and should be considered justly. As a small state, Mauritius has 
shown through its actions on these three topics that forming strong political alliances with 
large states is not necessarily the most important thing on the agenda. In contrast, the 
previous discussion shows that Mauritius is not afraid to create foreign policy based on 
what it believes to be important. The formation of strategic alliances is not the most 
important aspect of Mauritius' foreign policy. 
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The purpose of this thesis was to analyze small-state foreign policy behavior among six 
small island states. As the literature review illustrated, past research has mostly focused 
on the reasons why small states have sought alliances with large states. But, this thesis 
took a different approach, and questioned whether or not these alliances are even 
occumng. 
There were three substantive chapters. The first computed votes at the UN 
General Assembly to determine whether any trends were recognizable for the policy 
behaviors of the small states. As there was very little evidence supporting alliance 
formation in this chapter, the next chapter analyzed the type of actual behaviors that the 
selected small states have revealed in arenas such as the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIP). Many statements were presented in chapter 
three, which again demonstrated the idea that small-state foreign policy for the selected 
Pacific states does not necessarily suggest alliance formation with large states. Three 
Pacific states in the study gave very solid confirmation for this idea. They were Kiribati, 
Nauru, and Tuvalu. The two states that were not quite as convincing in their foreign 
policy behavior, however, were Palau and Tonga. The conclusions from this chapter 
were that though not all states have shown the capacity to challenge large states on issues 
of foreign policy, there are developments being made. Ultimately, it seems that chapter 
three presented enough evidence to at least challenge the currently accepted theories of 
small-state foreign policy. The following chapter shifted its focus to the Indian Ocean 
and analyzed the island country of Mauritius. Mauritius was examined on its foreign 
policy behavior toward the environment, the situation in Iraq, and the dispute it has with 
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the UK over the island of Diego Garcia. The conclusions from this chapter were similar 
to the previous chapters insomuch that it is difficult to characterize Mauritius' foreign 
policy as being shaped by alliances with large states. While Mauritius has actively 
sought disputes with large states, it seems that its policy behavior is probably not 
centered on such relationships. Rather, on the three selected issues Mauritius seemed to 
actively seek policy that fulfilled its own agenda. 
The ultimate conclusion is that small-state foreign policy is likely shifting in 
response to some of the new avenues that are opening up for small states. For example, 
the fact that the five Pacific states in this study have only recently gained admission to the 
egalitarian voting system of the UN General Assembly, suggests that more changes are 
likely for their future. Moreover, as more organizations like AOSIS and PIF become an 
accessible method for small states to assert their positions, it will is likely that alliances 
with large states will become less important. This thesis does not suggest that small 
states will eventually be completely independent from the support that large states offer, 
but it does submit that small-state strategies in foreign policy are not as dependent as they 
once were. 
As many of the current theories concerning alliance formation between small and 
large states are a result of the Cold War era, this thesis highlights more current patterns 
for small-state foreign policy. Due to the fact that the world is not as polarized as it was 
during the Cold War era, it seems that small states might have more options for their 
foreign policy decisions. With pressures not as strong to choose alliances between only 
two large states (i.e., Russia and the US), small states are now able to enter into alliances 
with various partners. Chapter two even suggested that interregional alliances might be a 
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new trend for small-state foreign policy behavior. Regardless of the reasoning, it is 
important to note that while institutions like the UN create new possibilities for small 
states, their foreign policy is likely to continue shifting. As the Cold War era is not far 
behind, tendencies in foreign policy have nonetheless been changing rapidly. 
One of the reasons that this thesis suggests might be causing the selected small 
states to opt out of alliances with larger states necessarily addresses the trend that small 
states can now participate in organizations that give them a coalescent voice. With small 
states uniting in organizations like the UN or PIF, they are now able have a much 
stronger impact on issues of foreign policy. Previously, it seemed less likely that any 
single small state would have had the type of impact on foreign policy that they have 
recently seen through such cooperation. However, this is not to say that this thesis was 
all-inclusive. Contrarily, it will be important for future studies to address some of other 
factors that might be influencing the type of alliance formation that small states are 
constructing. Issues such as the foreign aid that small states receive, the types of external 
threats that each particular state faces, and the role that colonialism has had, are all good 
points of departure for any future study. 
Two of the potential limitations of this thesis are quite simply that the selection of 
states was not as thorough as it could have been, and the selection of issues could have 
been more widespread. By only examining six small states, it is difficult to draw any 
wider conclusions about the behavior of all small-state foreign policy. Including 
examples from Europe (i.e., Luxembourg), or the Caribbean (i.e., Grenada) would have 
assisted in giving a more comprehensive conclusion. However, as was explained in the 
methodology section, the fact that the six states in this study have not received the type of 
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academic attention as other small states seemed to justify their selection. In addition, 
choosing states that had regional and institutional similarities added to this thesis. 
The selection of issues is another potential weakness of this thesis. As any given 
issue will produce different foreign policy behaviors for a particular country, it was 
important to select issues that were relevant for the small states. Chapter two included a 
wide range of issues in its analysis concerning voting behaviors at the UN. However, 
including more topics would have certainly given a more thorough representation of how 
the Pacific states are truly behaving in the General Assembly. In addition, the 
environmental focus of chapter three left almost all other topics to be speculated. Indeed, 
it was beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze all statements that the selected states 
have made on issues of foreign policy. But, by looking at one particular issue, the goal of 
chapter three was to give an overview of how the five Pacific states have reacted on an 
issue that greatly affects each of them. Lastly, one possible weakness of chapter four is 
that it does not perfectly fit the pattern, which was created in the previous chapters. 
Mauritius is not quite as small as the Pacific states in terms of size, economic capabilities, 
or population. Nor, is Mauritius even located in the same part of the world. However, 
the selection of Mauritius for the final chapter of this thesis was done for two reasons. 
First, it is important to realize whether or not the conclusions drawn from the Pacific 
examples are valid in other parts of the world. And, second, Mauritius is a small state 
with a longer history in organizations like the UN. Ultimately, chapter four was able to 
test whether the Pacific states were behaving differently than other small states, simply 
because of their newly appointed positions in the UN. There was a sense of balance 
achieved by adding the analysis of Mauritius. 
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Despite the fact that any academic work is limited in its predictive powers, this 
thesis does not pretend to create new theories for the field of international relations. 
Rather, what seems to be a better use of this work is simply in its capacity to build from 
previous theories, by suggesting alternative understandings for some of the world's 
lesser-known states. Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Mauritius do not 
generally gain much scholarly attention, but this does not mean that they should be 
forgotten. As decisions of foreign policy affect everyone, the people of small states have 
a stake in world events. While this thesis suggests that some small states have begun 
creating foreign policy without primary regard being given to the formation of alliances 
with large states, it seems that the implications are serious. 
80 
Ethridge 
References 
AFL-CIO. Executive Council. 1997. "U.N. Climate Change Negotiations." 
http://www.umwa.org/legaction/globalwarming/aflec.shtml. (July 2, 2004). 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). 2003. "AOSIS Background." 
http://www.sidsnet.org. (June 17, 2004). 
Anckar, D. 2000. "Westminster Democracy: A Comparison of Small Islands State 
Varieties in the Pacific and the Caribbean." Pacific Studies 23: 57-76. 
Anckar, D. 2002. "Why Are Small States Island States Democracies?" Round Table 365: 
375-390. 
Anckar, D., and Anckar, A. 2000. "Democracies Without Parties." Comparative Political 
Studies, 33 (2): 225-247. 
Anckar, D., and Anckar, A. 1995. "Size, Insularity and Democracy." Scandinavian 
Political Studies 18 (4): 211-229. 
Asia Pulse. "18 Million People in Oceania Affected by Climate and Weather Related 
Disasters." PacNews, 15 June 2004. 
Avery, 0. 1990. "Papua New Guinea and Its Breakaway Province ofBougainville: 
Negotiations in a Small State." Round Table 316: 416-424. 
Baehr, P.R. 1975. "Small States: a Tool for Analysis." World Politics 27 (3): 456-476. 
Bodansky, D. 1993. "The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary." Yale Journal of International Law 18: 451-553. 
Breuning, M. 1995. "Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior 
In the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom." International Studies 
Quarterly 39: 235-254. 
81 
Ethridge 
British Broadcasting Compnay (BBC). "Seven Pacific Countries Eligible for Iraq 
Rebuilding Contracts." BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 December 2003. 
British Broadcasting Company (BBC). "Mauritius No Longer Opposed to US's Garcia 
Military Base." BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 July 2004. 
--- 2004b. "Tongan Troops Leave for Iraq." BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 June 2004. 
Brunner, Borgna. 2004. "Where in the World is Diego Garcia." Infoplease Almanac. 
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/dg.html (July 20, 2004). 
Burton, B. "Australia: Relations Worsen With Pacific Neighbors." Inter Press 
Service/Global Information Network, 25 October 2002. 
CBSNews. "Diego Garcia: Exiles Still Barred." 60 Minutes Interview. 16 June 2003. 
Central Intelligence Agency. 2003. CIA -The World Factbook. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (November 27, 2003). 
Climate Action Network. 2004. "Direct Links to CAN Offices." July. 
http://climatenetwork.org/ (July 7, 2004). 
Dahl, R.A., and Tufte, E. 1973. Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Davis, J. 1996. "The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): The International 
Conscience." Asia-Pacific Magazine, No. 2 May, 17-22. 
East, M.A. 1973. "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models." World 
Politics 25: 556-576. 
Easter, C. 1999. "Small States Development: A Commonwealth Vulnerability Index." 
Round Table 351: 403-423. 
82 
Ethridge 
Elman, M. 1995. "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its 
Own Backyard." British Journal of Political Science 25 (2): 171-218. 
Espindola, R. 1987. "Social Features." In Politics, Security and Development in Small 
States, ed. C. Clarke and T. Payne. London: Allen and Unwin: 26-49. 
Financial Times Information. "US Holds 82 Pakistanis as Terror Suspects." Pakistani 
Press International Information Services Limited. 7 February 2004. 
Financial Times Information. "Changes to Palau's Banking Law Criticized." Global 
News Wire. 18 November 2003 
Gardiner, B. "Mauritius May Quit Commonwealth Over Diego Garcia Dispute." 
Associated Press. 9 July 2004. 
Government of Mauritius. "History of Mauritius." http://ncb.intnet.mu/govt/history.htm. 
(July 10, 2004). 
Hey, J. 2002. "Luxembourg's Foreign Policy: Does Small Size Help or Hinder?" 
Innovation 15 (3): 211-225. 
Hindermarsh, J.H. 1996. "How Do We Define Small States and Islands? A Critical 
Analysis of Alternative Conceptualizations." Convergence 29 (2): 36-45. 
Hong, M. 1995. "Small States in the United Nations." UNESCO 144: 277-287. 
Houghton, J.T. et al. 1990. The IPPC [Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change] 
Scientific Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Julien, K.S. 1992. "The Problems of Small States." Round Table 321: 45-51. 
Katzenstein, P. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Keohane, R. 1969. "Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics." 
International Organization 23: 291-310. 
83 
Ethridge 
Krebs, R. 1999. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." 
International Organization 53 (2): 343-377. 
Liska, G. 1968. Alliances and the Third World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 
Mauritius Labour Party. 2004. "Iraq Invasion - Mauritius Position." 
http://labour.intnet.mu/mlp/files/iraqmtiuspositionpnq2503 03 .htm (July 15, 2004 ). 
Nationmaster. 2004. "Encyclopedia: Military of Tonga." 
http://www.nationmaster.com/ encyclopedia/Mili tar-of-Tonga. (July 15, 2 004). 
Nationwide News. "War on Iraq: Coalition of the Willing." The Weekend Australian, 5 
April, 2003. 
Osgood, R. E. 1968. Alliances and American Foreign Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press. 
Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS). 2004. "About the Forum." 
http://www.forumsec.org.fi/ (July 16, 2004). 
Panafrican News. "Mauritius Threatens Legal Action Against London Over Chagos." 
Global News Wire, 19 May 2004. 
Read, R. 2003. "The Implications of Increasing Globalization and Regionalism for the 
Economic Growth of Small Island States." World Development 32 (2): 365-378. 
Reilly, B. 2000. "The Africanisation of the South Pacific." Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 54 (3): 261-268. 
Rothstein, R. L. 1968. Alliances and Small Powers. New York and London: Columbia 
University Press. 
Sanders, R. 1989. "The Relevance and Function of Diplomacy in International Politics 
for Small Caribbean States." The Round Table 312: 413-424. 
84 
Sanders, R. 1997. "The Growing Vulnerability of Small States: The Caribbean 
Revisited." Round Table 343: 361-375. 
Ethridge 
Scientists for Global Responsibility. 2004. "Promoting Ethical Science and Technology." 
http://sgr.org.uk/ (July 7, 2004). 
Singer, M. 1972. Weak States in a World of Powers. New York: The Free Press. 
Srebmik, H. 2003. "Small Island Nations and Democratic Values." World Development 
32 (2): 329-341. 
Strathem, A. et al. 2002. Oceania: An Introduction to the Cultures and Identities of 
Pacific Islanders. Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 
Sutton, P. 1987. "Political Aspects." In Politics, Security and Development in Small 
States, ed. Clarke, C. and Payne, T. London: Allen and Unwin: 3-25. 
Sutton, P. 1999. "What are the Priorities for Small States in the International System?" 
Round Table 351: 397-403. 
Tait, P. "Sinking Pacific States Slam U.S. Over Sea Levels." Reuters, 16 August 2002. 
United Nations. 2000. "A Guide to the Climate Change Process: The Kyoto Protocol." 
http://unfccc.int/text/resource/process/components/responses/respkp.html. (July 8, 
2004). 
United Nations. 2001. "Statement by H.E. Vinci N. Clodumar." 
http://www.un.int/nauru/statementlO.html. (July 11, 2004). 
United Nations. 2003a. "Research Guide." http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ 
resguide/garesl.htm (November 1, 2003). 
-- 2003b. "Growth Overview." http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (November 2, 
2003). 
85 
Ethridge 
-- 2003c. "UNSC Members." http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/unsc members.html (December 
13, 2003). 
-- 2003d. "UNBISNET." http://unbisnet.un.org/ipac-cgi/ipac (November 21, 2003). 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2004. "A Guide 
to the Climate Change Process: The Kyoto Protocol." 
http://unfccc.int/text/resource/process/components/response/respkp.html. (July 8, 
2004). 
Vayrynen, R. 1983. "Small States in Different Theoretical Traditions of International 
Relations Research." In Small States in Europe and Dependence, ed. Holl, 0. 
Boulder: Westview. 
Vital, D. 1967. The Inequality of States. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Weiss, T., Forsythe, D., Coate, A. 1994. The United Nations and Changing World 
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Zahariadis, N. 1994. "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response 
to the Macedonian Issue." Political Science Quarterly 109 (4): 647-668. 
Ziring, L., Riggs, R., Plano, J. 2000. The United Nations: International Organization and 
World Politics. Third Edition. Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers. 
86 
